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This paper investigates the impact of changes in the level of taxation on economic activity.  We use
the narrative record -- presidential speeches, executive-branch documents, and Congressional reports
-- to identify the size, timing, and principal motivation for all major postwar tax policy actions.  This
narrative analysis allows us to separate revenue changes resulting from legislation from changes occurring
for other reasons.  It also allows us to further separate legislated changes into those taken for reasons
related to prospective economic conditions, such as countercyclical actions and tax changes tied to
changes in government spending, and those taken for more exogenous reasons, such as to reduce an
inherited budget deficit or to promote long-run growth.  We then examine the behavior of output following
these more exogenous legislated changes.  The resulting estimates indicate that tax increases are highly
contractionary.  The effects are strongly significant, highly robust, and much larger than those obtained
using broader measures of tax changes.  The large effect stems in considerable part from a powerful
negative effect of tax increases on investment.  We also find that legislated tax increases designed
to reduce a persistent budget deficit appear to have much smaller output costs than other tax increases.
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
  Tax changes have been a major public policy issue in recent years.  The tax cuts of 2001 and 
2003 were passed amid firestorms of debate about their likely effects.  Some policymakers claimed that 
the cuts would both stimulate the economy in the short run and increase normal output in the long run.  
Others argued that they would raise interest rates and lower confidence, and thereby reduce output in both 
the short run and the long run.   
  That views of the effects of tax changes vary so radically largely reflects the fact that measuring 
these effects is very difficult.  Changes in taxes occur for many reasons.  Some legislated tax changes are 
passed for philosophical reasons or to reduce the budget deficit.  Others are passed because a war is in 
progress or because the economy is weak and predicted to fall further.  And many major changes in 
revenues are not legislated at all, but occur automatically because the tax base varies with the overall level 
of income, or result from changes in stock prices, inflation, and other non-policy forces.  Because the 
factors that give rise to tax changes are often correlated with other developments in the economy, 
disentangling the effects of the tax changes from the effects of these underlying factors is inherently 
difficult.   
A concrete example of this difficulty concerns the impact of legislated countercyclical tax 
changes.  Suppose policymakers sometimes deliberately change taxes to prevent recessions or booms.  If 
the policies are well timed and have the desired effects, output will grow normally following these 
changes.  And if such changes make up an important part of overall tax changes, a statistician confronted 
with data on tax changes and the behavior of output will tend to underestimate the effects of tax changes 
on output. 




there are pervasive possibilities for omitted variable bias.  In the case of legislated countercyclical tax 
changes, some factor is both affecting the future path of output and causing policymakers to change taxes.  
In the case of the automatic response of taxes to output, any omitted factor that affects output also affects 
taxes.  And many non-policy forces other than output that affect revenues, such as movements in stock 
prices, may have direct effects on output.  Failure to take the omitted variables into account will result in 
inaccurate estimates of the macroeconomic effects of tax changes. 
Unfortunately, controlling for the omitted variables is exceedingly difficult.  The automatic 
response of taxes to output can be addressed by cyclical adjustment of revenues, although one has to be 
concerned about the accuracy of the adjustment.  But controlling for all other non-policy factors that 
affect revenues and that could directly affect output is essentially impossible, and there are estimates of 
the contribution of these factors to changes in revenues only for the recent past.  And for legislated 
countercyclical changes, the problems are even more severe.  Here the omitted variable is information 
available to policymakers about how output would evolve in the absence of tax changes.  However, useful 
numerical forecasts of any sort are largely non-existent before the mid-1960s, and forecasts based on the 
crucial assumption of no policy change are rarely available even for recent tax changes. 
  We therefore pursue an alternative approach.  There exists a vast narrative record describing the 
history and motivation of tax policy changes.  We use the narrative history to isolate legislated tax 
changes from changes in revenues related to economic conditions and other non-policy influences.  We 
use the information on motivation to separate legislated tax changes into those that can legitimately be 
used to measure the macroeconomic effects of tax changes and those that are likely to be contaminated by 
other developments.  We then use the legitimate observations to derive estimates of the effects of tax 
changes on output that are likely to be less biased than previous estimates. 
The narrative analysis, which is described in Section II of the paper, is clearly the foundation of 
the study.  We use sources such as presidential speeches, the Economic Report of the President, and the 
reports of Congressional committees to identify the motivation for each legislated tax change.  Most 




to maintain normal growth in the anticipation of other changes), and those taken for other reasons.  The 
changes taken to achieve or maintain normal growth, which for want of a better term we call endogenous, 
are likely to lead to biased estimates of the effects of fiscal policy.  The changes not motivated by current 
or projected economic conditions, which we call exogenous, are appropriate for measuring the effects of 
tax changes on output.  These exogenous changes constitute our new measure of fiscal shocks.  We also 
look at finer breakdowns of motivation.  The endogenous legislated tax changes can be divided into truly 
countercyclical changes and changes undertaken because government spending was changing.  The 
exogenous legislated tax changes can be divided into changes taken to reduce an inherited budget deficit 
and those taken to spur long-run growth.  In addition to identifying the motivation for each tax change, we 
also use the narrative record to identify the timing and magnitude of the revenue effects. 
  This cataloging and classifying of all legislated U.S. tax changes since World War II reveals 
some interesting patterns and trends, which we discuss in Section III.  The most striking finding is that 
endogenous tax changes virtually disappeared after 1980:  both countercyclical and spending-driven tax 
changes were common in the 1960s and 1970s, but have been very rare in the last 25 years.  Tax changes 
for long-run growth (broadly defined to include such philosophical motivations as shrinking the size of 
government and promoting entrepreneurship) are relatively common throughout the postwar era.  A 
comparison of our new measure of exogenous tax changes with the behavior of cyclically adjusted 
revenues, a more common measure of tax changes, shows that there are crucial differences between the 
two series. 
  Armed with our series of exogenous tax changes, we examine the effects of taxes on real output.  
In Section IV we present baseline estimates of these effects using our new measure, and investigate 
whether the results differ from those derived using broader measures of tax changes.  We find that 
exogenous tax increases have a large, rapid, and highly statistically significant negative effect on output.  
The estimated impact is larger and more significant than when broader measures, such as the change in 
cyclically adjusted revenues or all legislated tax changes, are used.  This suggests that the bias economic 




output when we disaggregate the motivations for tax changes more finely provides additional insight into 
the baseline estimates.  For example, among endogenous legislated tax changes, the behavior of output 
following countercyclical tax changes is only moderately different from its behavior following exogenous 
changes, while its behavior following spending-driven tax changes is radically different.  Among 
exogenous tax changes, we find that tax increases motivated by a desire to reduce an inherited deficit 
appear to have much smaller effects on output than tax changes taken for long-run reasons.   
In Section V, we test the robustness of our estimates along a number of dimensions.  Most 
importantly, we include a number of control variables in our baseline regression.  Though our measure of 
exogenous tax changes should not be systematically correlated with current or near-term projected 
developments, such correlation is possible in small samples.  For this reason, we reestimate our regression 
controlling for the state of the economy, monetary policy shocks, and the behavior of government 
spending.  We find that the estimated effect of exogenous tax changes on output is extremely robust.   
In Section VI, we extend our findings in four ways.  First, we ask whether tax changes have 
important effects through expectations.  Second, we test whether the effects of tax actions have changed 
over time.  Third, we look at the effects of our new measure of fiscal shocks on inflation and 
unemployment, as a way of gauging whether demand-side or supply-side effects appear to dominate.  
Finally, we examine how exogenous tax changes affect the components of GDP, such as consumption, 
investment, and imports.  The most striking finding of this exercise is that tax increases have a large 
negative effect on investment. 
The literature examining the effects of changes in the level of taxes on output is relatively small.  
Some early studies, such as Andersen and Jordan (1968), simply regress output growth on measures of 
high-employment spending and receipts.  Two more sophisticated recent studies are Blanchard and Perotti 
(2002) and Perotti (1999).  Like the earlier studies, these studies assume that once one corrects for the 
impact of economic activity on revenues and controls for the behavior of government spending, changes 
in revenues are uncorrelated with other determinants of output growth.  Thus, they do not address the 




revenues and other determinants of output growth. 
A related literature looks at the possibility of ￿expansionary fiscal contractions￿ (for example, 
Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990, and Alesina and Perotti, 1997).  However, these papers also measure tax 
changes using cyclically adjusted or actual revenues.  We extend work on this possibility not only by 
employing a sounder measure of fiscal shocks, but also by looking at actions designed to lower budget 
deficits in less extreme circumstances than the ones considered in previous studies. 
In its analysis of the components of GDP and the transmission mechanism, our study ties in with 
a larger literature.  Studies by Kormendi (1983), Cardia (1997), and a host of others surveyed in Gale and 
Orszag (2004) analyze the impact of tax changes on consumption.  The estimated impact of tax increases 
on consumption in these studies ranges from roughly no effect to a substantial negative effect.  The results 
using our new measure of fiscal shocks support the view that the effects are large and negative.  
  Methodologically, the approach we use is related to our earlier work on monetary policy (Romer 
and Romer, 1989, 2004).  As with fiscal policy, estimating the effects of monetary policy is difficult both 
because measures of policy can respond automatically to economic developments, and because 
policymakers often adjust policy on the basis of information about prospective economic developments.  
Our work addresses these difficulties by bringing in information from the narrative record about the 
motives for policy changes.  The research on fiscal policy that is most similar in methodology is the work 
of Ramey and Shapiro (1998) examining the effect of changes in government spending.  Using news 
reports in Business Week and other historical accounts, Ramey and Shapiro identify major military build-
ups that occurred for reasons unrelated to the state of the economy or prospective macroeconomic 
developments.  Because the build-ups were the result of outside forces, they can be used to estimate the 
impact of government purchases on the economy.  Ramey and Shapiro find that this approach leads to a 







II.  DERIVING THE NEW MEASURE OF FISCAL SHOCKS 
 
  The first, and by far the most time-consuming, part of our study is the narrative analysis of tax 
changes.  The goal of this analysis is not simply to construct a narrative history of postwar tax changes.  
Rather, the analysis is designed to provide an input into the empirical estimation.  We use the historical 
record to identify the motivation, revenue effects, and other characteristics of legislated postwar tax 
changes.  This analysis allows us to separate tax changes into those that can successfully be used to 
estimate the macroeconomic effects of tax changes, and those that cannot. 
 
A.  Sources 
The sources for the narrative analysis are primary documents produced by policymakers at the 
time.  For the executive branch, one key source is the Economic Report of the President (abbreviated in 
what follows as Economic Report).  This document is released each January and typically provides a 
detailed discussion of the motivation, revenue effects, and nature of tax changes in the previous calendar 
year.  A second key source is presidential speeches.
1  Tax actions are often discussed in the State of the 
Union Address, the Annual Budget Message, and addresses proposing or upon signing the legislation.    
Because tax actions are often first proposed during presidential campaigns, we also examine the 
acceptance speeches at the nominating conventions.  The other two executive branch documents that we 
consult systematically are the Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of the Finances 
(abbreviated as Treasury Annual Report; the Treasury stopped publishing detailed annual reports in 1981) 
and the Budget of the United States Government (abbreviated as Budget). 
  For the legislative branch, our main sources are the reports prepared on each tax bill by the House 
Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee.  When the bill appears to have changed 
substantially after the reports, we examine the floor debate in the Congressional Record.  The Conference 
                                                     
1 Presidential speeches and other presidential papers are available online from John Woolley and Gerhard Peters, 




report prepared on each bill is sometimes a useful source of revenue estimates.  Likewise, summaries 
prepared by the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation (after 1975, the Joint Committee on 
Taxation) often provide detailed information about the timing and revenue effects.  The reports of the 
Congressional Budget Office, which was created in 1974, are also a useful source of revenue estimates.  
  For Social Security tax changes, we consult two additional sources.  The Social Security Bulletin 
typically contains one or two articles on the motivation and revenue effects of Social Security tax actions.  
Similar material is sometimes also contained in the Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal 
Old Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund. 
 
B.  Identifying Legislated Tax Changes 
  The first step in the analysis is to identify all significant legislated tax changes in the period 1947 
to 2006.  To do this we simply look for tax changes that receive more than incidental mention in our 
sources.  Any measure, including executive actions, that receives serious discussion is included in our 
enumeration.  Measures that are referred to only in passing or are discussed only in lists of all measures 
that affected revenues over some period are excluded.  Since this approach leads us to include even tax 
changes with very small revenue effects, we feel this is a fundamentally sensible listing of the important 
tax policy changes over the postwar era. 
  In considering tax changes, we limit ourselves to actions that actually change tax liabilities from 
one quarter to the next.  Because our interest is in the effects of changes in the actual level of taxation, a 
new law that merely extends an existing tax does not count as a change for our purposes.   
  Identifying legislated tax changes is a useful exercise in its own right.  Focusing on legislated 
changes is clearly one way to address the fact that tax revenues are affected by the state of the economy. 
It also eliminates the effect of other non-policy factors, such as inflation and the distribution of income, 






C.  Classifying Motivation 
A second component of the narrative analysis is the identification of the primary motivation for 
each legislated tax change.  The classification that we use reflects the effects we are trying to measure.  
We are interested in the effects of tax changes on real economic performance.  Therefore, we want to 
separate legislated tax changes into those that are motivated by the state of the economy and those that are 
not.  More specifically, we want to test whether tax changes cause output growth to differ from normal.  
Therefore, in our classification scheme what we want to separate are changes aimed at keeping growth at 
normal and changes that are either aimed at moving growth away from normal, or taken without regard to 
their effects on growth.  We will refer to tax changes aimed at keeping growth at normal as ￿endogenous￿ 
and tax changes taken for other reasons as ￿exogenous.￿ 
Endogenous Tax Changes.  The most obvious kind of endogenous tax changes are 
countercyclical actions.  If the economy is predicted to decline and Congress passes a tax cut to mitigate 
the downturn, this is clearly an action motivated by a desire to return growth to normal.  Likewise, if the 
economy is predicted to grow faster than normal and taxes are raised to slow growth, this is an 
endogenous, countercyclical action.  Such countercyclical actions are precisely the kinds of observations 
whose inclusion could bias estimates of the effects of tax actions on the real economy. 
In identifying a countercyclical motivation, we take policymakers￿ statements at face value.   
However, it is obviously possible that policymakers invoke countercyclical arguments when other 
motivations are in fact key, or that their perceptions of normal growth are overly optimistic.  Both of these 
possibilities may cause us to overclassify actions as countercyclical, and hence endogenous.  Therefore, 
taking policymakers at their word causes us to err on the side of excluding legitimate observations, rather 
than including illegitimate ones.  This strategy may make our estimates of the effects of tax changes less 
precise, but ensures that the bias in the point estimates is as small as possible. 
There are at least two ways to deduce from the narrative record whether actions were intended to 
return growth to normal.  Often, it is simply discussed directly.  Additionally, if output is growing 




what would happen to unemployment provide a way of judging if a tax change is intended to return 
growth to normal or to generate abnormal growth. 
  An even more important subcategory of endogenous tax actions are tax changes motivated by 
spending changes.  Suppose that policymakers increase spending, perhaps because the country is involved 
in a war or because a new social insurance program is added, and they decide to raise taxes to pay for it.  
We feel that it is reasonable to assume that policymakers understand that the spending change will tend to 
push growth above normal if they do not make the counteracting tax change.  Therefore, this is, in effect, 
a tax change aimed at keeping growth normal.  Classifying such a spending-driven tax change as 
endogenous is crucial because the tax change is clearly correlated with another development, a spending 
change, that is likely to affect output.
2   
  Exogenous Tax Changes.  We classify as exogenous any tax change not motivated by a desire to 
return output growth to normal.  This category therefore encompasses a wide range of motivations.  The 
unifying principle is that these are either changes designed to move growth away from normal or changes 
taken irrespective of their effects on growth.  In essence, they are tax changes not taken in response to 
information about future economic developments.  As a result, they are legitimate observations to use to 
estimate the macroeconomic effects of tax policy. 
  One common type of action in this category are tax increases to deal with an inherited budget 
deficit.  An inherited deficit reflects economic conditions and budgetary decisions in the past, not current 
economic conditions or contemporaneous spending changes.  If policymakers decide to raise taxes to 
reduce such a deficit, this is not a change motivated by a desire to return growth to normal or to prevent 
abnormal growth.  So it would be exogenous.
3 
                                                     
2 Also included as endogenous tax changes are procyclical actions.  On one occasion (the Tax Reduction and 
Simplification Act of 1977), policymakers acknowledged that the economy was growing faster than normal, but they 
nevertheless cut taxes because they wanted even faster growth.  Because we would classify such a change as 
endogenous if growth were below normal, treating it as exogenous when growth begins above normal would tend to 
bias the results toward finding a large effect of tax changes on output.  For this reason, we classify procyclical 
actions as endogenous.  Because there is only one such action, we do not emphasize this third subcategory of 
endogenous actions.   
3 One difficult case that occurs periodically in the 1980s and 1990s is a deficit reduction package that includes both 




  All other tax changes in this category can be thought of as being, at some level, motivated by a 
desire to raise long-run growth.  A very common tax cut is one in which policymakers say that the 
economy is doing fine (output is growing normally), but they want output to grow faster than normal.  
Occasionally the motivation is expressed as a desire for a temporary boom, but more often it is expressed 
as a belief that the tax reduction will raise the growth rate of potential output.  Tax cuts for philosophical 
reasons, such as to shrink the size of government or for fairness, also typically have at their core a belief 
that they will raise long-run growth.  Because it is often hard to separate these various motivations, we 
combine them under the broad rubric of long-run growth.  But, this is admittedly a catchall category of 
exogenous tax changes not motivated by a desire to deal with the budget deficit. 
  Applying the Criteria.  Armed with this classification scheme, it is usually straightforward to 
categorize the motive for each action.  Typically, there is a single motive emphasized in a source, and 
there is substantial agreement across sources.  When sources disagree, we attempt to ascertain what the 
bulk of the evidence suggests was the motive.  Likewise, when multiple motives are mentioned, we 
attempt to see if one is clearly emphasized over the others. 
  Occasionally, there appear to genuinely be multiple motivations for a single bill.  This is the case, 
for example, with the Economic Recovery and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001.  A large tax cut 
was originally proposed during the 2000 presidential campaign, when the economy was growing 
normally.  The key motivations appear to have been a belief in limited government and a desire to 
stimulate long-run growth.  Thus, at a fundamental level, it was not a tax cut aimed at restoring growth to 
normal, and so would be classified as exogenous.  However, by the time the cut was passed in June 2001, 
concerns about a developing recession were frequently mentioned.  The plan was also changed to include 
an immediate rebate to jumpstart the economy, rather than being phased in beginning in 2002 as called for 
in the original proposal.  In this and in the few other cases like it, we find that it is possible to apportion 
                                                     
normal, they are exogenous in our classification scheme.  However, these cases have the unfortunate characteristic 
that the spending change and the tax change are clearly correlated, and are likely to affect output in the same 
direction.  As a result, the inclusion of these episodes in the empirical analysis may lead to an overestimate of the 
effects of tax changes.  Fortunately, the most problematic of these cases for our study, times when the tax increase is 
small and the spending decrease is large, are rare.  Nevertheless, in the empirical work we test whether deficit-driven 




motivation quite well.  The changes to taxes in 2001 that were added to the bill because of concern about 
the recession are endogenous (for countercyclical purposes).  The reductions in taxes in 2002 and later 
years are exogenous (for long-run growth).  Fortunately, we find that cases such as this one, where the 
stated motives change substantially over time or suggest a troubling mix of endogenous and exogenous 
considerations, are uncommon.   
 
D.  Timing and Revenue Estimates 
  In addition to identifying the motivation for each tax change, we identify other characteristics 
from the narrative record.  One obvious one is the quarter that the tax change took effect.  The narrative 
record is virtually always explicit about whether the action took place immediately upon signing, at a 
certain date in the future, or was phased in over several dates.  To convert these specific dates to a 
quarterly value we follow a simple rule:  if the effective date is on or before the midpoint of the quarter, it 
is assigned to that quarter; if it is after the midpoint of the quarter, it is assigned to the subsequent quarter. 
  In our baseline analysis, we date the changes according to when liabilities changed, not according 
to when households and firms learned that tax liabilities would be different.  For example, we treat the tax 
increases resulting from the Social Security Amendments of 1983 not as a single large tax increase in 
1983Q2, when the bill was signed, but as five separate tax increases over the period 1984 to 1990, when 
taxes actually changed.  This approach is consistent with an extensive literature, much of it based on 
natural tax experiments, that finds consumers respond strongly to current disposable income.
4  In Section 
VI, however, we investigate the impact of assigning the revenue effects to the dates that bills were passed 
rather than the dates the changes took effect. 
  Deducing the revenue effects of the tax changes is often challenging.  Conceptually what we want 
is the effect of a tax change on liabilities at the prevailing level of GDP.  Since retrospective figures are 
rarely available and contemporaneous documents generally provide enough information for us to 
                                                     





construct such estimates, we rely on contemporaneous sources.  Whenever possible, we derive a 
consensus estimate from multiple sources.  We place particular emphasis on the estimates in the 
Economic Reports because they are the most straightforward and appear to be consistent over time.  We 
also find that the Conference report on a bill often provides detailed revenue information for the final 
form of the legislation. 
We express all revenue effects at an annual rate.  Often, the revenue effects are simply stated this 
way in our sources.  Sometimes, the sources give the expected effects of the change on the path of 
revenues.  In these cases, we use the estimated impact of the action in its first full calendar year (which, 
for the many tax actions that take effect on January 1, is equivalent to the effects in the first year).  
Occasionally, if only fiscal year data are available, we use the estimated impact in the first full fiscal year 
after the change. 
  Finally, tax changes often have retroactive components.  We treat these components as one-time 
levies or rebates in the quarters the bills that included them were passed.  For example, suppose a tax 
increase is retroactive for one quarter and this extra quarter will bring in $1 billion in revenues.  In the 
quarter the tax increase is passed, there is an extra increase of $4 billion (because of conversion to annual 
rates).  Then, in the next quarter, there is a tax cut of $4 billion because the retroactive feature disappears.  
As this example suggests, accounting for the retroactive features of tax changes often makes our estimates 
quite volatile on a quarter-to-quarter basis.  But these short-run ups and downs should have little impact 
on the broad features of our estimates of the effects of tax changes.  Nonetheless, as a robustness check, 
we examine the effects of excluding the retroactive features from our series for tax changes. 
 
E.  Application of the Narrative Methodology 
  A companion background paper (Romer and Romer, 2007) provides more information about our 
analysis of the narrative record and discusses our application of the methodology for each major 
legislated tax change since 1947.  In every case we give our overall assessment of what the record reveals 




quotations and citations that other researchers can see why we classify tax changes as we do and can 
check our analysis. 
  To give a sense of how we apply our procedures, Exhibits 1 through 4 reproduce four of our 
narrative summaries.  We choose the examples to illustrate the four different types of motivation:  a 
countercyclical change, a tax change tied to a spending change, a change for deficit reduction, and a 
change to encourage long-run growth.  We also try to show changes from different eras. 
 
 
III.  POSTWAR LEGISLATED TAX CHANGES 
 
  Our narrative sources identify 49 tax laws (and administrative actions) between 1947 and 2006 
that significantly changed tax liabilities. These laws changed taxes in 82 quarters.  A number of these 
quarters had tax changes of multiple types.  In all, we identify 104 separate quarterly tax changes.  Of 
these, 65 were exogenous and 39 were endogenous.   
As described above, the exogenous tax changes should be valid observations for investigating the 
macroeconomic effects of tax changes.  The first step in using this new series of fiscal shocks is to discuss 
some of its properties.  Have there been changes over time in the number, size, and specific motivation of 
exogenous tax changes?  It is also possible to examine trends in the endogenous changes.  Finally, it is 
useful to examine how our new series on exogenous tax changes compares with the change in cyclically 
adjusted revenues, the most commonly used alternative indicator of tax changes.   
  Our estimates of the revenue effects of each tax change are in nominal terms.  Before one can 
sensibly discuss trends over time or include the series in an empirical framework, we need to put the 
values on a consistent basis.  To do this, we express each revenue effect as a percent of nominal GDP in 
the quarter the change occurred.
5   
                                                     
5 The data on nominal GDP are from the National Income and Product Accounts, Table 1.1.5 (www.bea.gov, 




A.  Exogenous Tax Changes 
  Panel (a) of Figure 1 shows our series of exogenous tax changes since 1947.
6  The graph shows 
that there have been both positive and negative exogenous tax changes throughout the postwar era.   
Certain eras, however, have seen particularly frequent changes.  The early 1960s, the late 1970s, and the 
1980s were periods of rapid and extreme exogenous tax actions.  While some of these changes were fairly 
small, quarterly changes of ‰ to 1 percent of GDP have been fairly common.  The largest quarterly 
exogenous tax action was a cut in taxes of nearly 2 percent of GDP in 1948Q2. 
  Panel (b) shows the two types of exogenous tax changes, those for deficit reduction and those for 
long-run growth, separately.  Not surprisingly, the vast majority of tax actions in the catchall category of 
long-run growth are tax cuts.  However, because this group includes tax reforms for efficiency and 
fairness, it contains some tax increases.  For example, the Tax Reform Act of 1976 closed tax loopholes 
that were thought to be encouraging efforts at tax evasion.  The most significant tax cuts to stimulate 
long-run growth are well known:  the 1948 tax cut passed over Truman￿s veto; the 1964 Kennedy-
Johnson tax cut; the 1981 Reagan tax cut; and the 2001 and 2003 Bush tax cuts. 
  All of the deficit-driven tax changes were tax increases.  The figure makes clear that while 
deficit-driven tax increases have occurred throughout the postwar era, they were most prevalent in the 
early and mid-1980s.  Many of these deficit-driven tax actions were related to Social Security:  of the 26 
actions in the category, 15 were designed to deal with the long-run solvency of the Social Security 
system.  The Social Security Amendments of 1977 and 1983, in particular, were major tax actions that 
raised taxes in a number of steps and did not simultaneously increase benefits.  The largest deficit-driven 
tax increases not related to Social Security were those contained in the Tax Equity and Fiscal 
Responsibility Tax Act of 1982, and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Acts of 1987, 1990, and 1993.  
The first two of these were Reagan-era measures; the third was the Bush tax increase that defied his 
famous ￿Read my lips:  no new taxes￿ campaign speech; and the fourth was the Rubinomics-defining tax 
                                                     
6 As described above, many of the tax laws contain retroactive provisions, which tend to make the series somewhat 
volatile.  To facilitate the identification of trends over time, the figures show the series excluding retroactive 




increase of the early Clinton administration. 
 
B.  Endogenous Tax Changes 
  Panel (a) of Figure 2 shows our series on endogenous tax changes.  The graph shows that there 
were many endogenous actions before 1980 and almost none since then.  Panel (b) shows the two 
subcategories of endogenous actions, countercyclical and spending-driven, separately. 
  The heyday for countercyclical tax changes was the ten years from 1965 to 1975.  We find no 
actions in the 1950s for which the primary motivation was a desire to counteract current or prospective 
economic conditions.  The two largest countercyclical tax changes were the 1968 tax surcharge and the 
1975 tax cut.  Countercyclical actions were nonexistent in the 1980s and 1990s.  We find, however, that 
countercyclical motives were present for part of the 2001 Bush tax cut and all of the post-September-11
th 
cuts contained in the Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002. 
  Spending-driven tax actions were virtually always tax increases.  The two exceptions occurred in 
1954 and 1998:  Eisenhower and Clinton emphasized that taxes were being reduced in these years 
because spending was being cut.  A large fraction of the spending-driven tax increases were related to 
Social Security:  12 of the 22 changes in this category were tax increases specifically tied to 
contemporaneous increases in Social Security spending.  The most extreme example was the substantial 
payroll tax increase to pay for the introduction of Medicare in 1965.  However, there were numerous tax 
increases to finance expansions of coverage and increases in benefits in the 1950s, 1960s, and early 
1970s.  The largest spending-driven tax increases occurred during the Korean War.   
 
C.  Comparison with Cyclically Adjusted Revenues 
  The change in cyclically adjusted revenues is the standard macroeconomic measure of tax 
changes.  For that reason, it is useful to see how our measure of exogenous tax changes compares with 
this series. 




automatically because many taxes are a function of income or expenditure.  Cyclically adjusted revenues 
are calculated as what revenues would be if GDP were at its normal trend level.  Estimates of cyclically 
adjusted revenues are constructed by the Congressional Budget Office.
7  To make the comparison to our 
series as direct as possible, we divide cyclically adjusted revenues by the chain-type price index for GDP 
to convert it to a real series, and then compute the change in real cyclically adjusted revenues.  This 
change is then normalized by dividing by real GDP.  Thus, both this measure of cyclically adjusted 
revenues and our series of exogenous tax changes show the change in revenues as a percent of GDP.
8 
One complication is that the quarterly data on cyclically adjusted revenues are not available 
before 1960.  However, over the period where the data are available, the change in the gap between actual 
and cyclically adjusted real revenues can be predicted almost perfectly using real output growth.  As a 
result, it is straightforward to project the change in real cyclically adjusted revenues backward.  To do 
this, we first estimate the relationship between the change in the gap between actual and cyclically 
adjusted revenues and output growth over an adjacent period for which we have data on cyclically 
adjusted revenues.  We then apply the estimated relationship to the earlier period and combine the fitted 
values with data on the change in actual revenues to obtain estimates of the change in cyclically adjusted 
revenues.
9 
                                                     
7 We use the unpublished quarterly values, which are generated in a manner consistent with CBO￿s annual figures. 
8 The data on the price index for GDP are from the National Income and Product Accounts, Table 1.1.4 
(downloaded 9/15/06).  We calculate real GDP by dividing nominal GDP by the price index for GDP.  The obvious 
difference in normalization is that for our series we divide the nominal revenue effects by nominal GDP and for 
cyclically adjusted revenues we divide the change in real revenues by real GDP.  This difference is necessary 
because much of the change in nominal cyclically adjusted revenues from one quarter to the next is due to inflation, 
while the revenue effects of particular laws are relatively unaffected by inflation. 
9 Specifically, we regress the change in the difference between the logarithms of actual and cyclically adjusted real 
revenues on a constant and the growth rate of real GDP.  The sample period is the first decade for which we have 
quarterly data on cyclically adjusted revenues (1960Q2￿1970Q1).  This yields: 
∆ [lnRt ￿ lnCt]  =  ￿0.019  +  1.88 ∆ lnYt, 
                                                                                           (0.001)   (0.05) 
                                                              R
2 = 0.97, s.e.e. = 0.0029, D.W. = 1.46. 
R is actual real revenues, measured as the ratio of federal current receipts from the National Income and Product 
Accounts, Table 3.2 (downloaded 9/17/06) to the chain-type price index for GDP.  C is cyclically adjusted real 
revenues.  Y is the chain-type quantity index for GDP from the National Income and Product Accounts, Table 1.1.3 
(downloaded 9/15/06).  The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  The variable we wish to construct, the 
change in real cyclically adjusted revenues divided by real GDP, equals [∆Rt ￿ ∆(Rt ￿ Ct)]/Real GDPt.  This is 
approximately equal to {∆Rt ￿ [∆(lnRt ￿ lnCt)]Rt}/Real GDPt.  Our constructed estimate for the period 1947Q2 to 




  Panel (a) of Figure 3 compares cyclically adjusted revenues with our measure of exogenous tax 
changes.  This graph shows that most of the movements in our series of exogenous tax changes are 
reflected in movements in cyclically adjusted revenues.  There are sometimes important differences in 
timing and noticeable differences in magnitude, but overall there is a substantial relationship, especially in 
the large exogenous tax changes. 
  At the same time, there are crucial differences between the two series.  Many movements in 
cyclically adjusted revenues have no counterpart in our series.  Some of the largest of these correspond to 
endogenous legislated tax changes that we deliberately exclude.  This is true, for example, of the Korean 
War tax increases in the early 1950s and the 1975 tax cut.  These substantial differences suggest that 
eliminating endogenous actions makes our new series of exogenous tax changes very different from the 
standard indicator of tax policy. 
Another key source of differences between the two series is our focus on legislated changes.  The 
easiest way to see this is to compare the change in cyclically adjusted revenues with our series of all 
legislated tax changes (both exogenous and endogenous).  This comparison is shown in panel (b) of 
Figure 3.  Many of the largest differences in the previous comparison disappear when endogenous 
changes are included in our measure.  But, some large differences still remain.  Notice, for example, the 
sustained increases in cyclically adjusted revenues in the mid- and late 1990s, a time when there was only 
one minor legislated tax change.  This rise was due in considerable part to the booming stock market 
(Congressional Budget Office, 2002, pp. 50-52).  The early and late 1970s are another period when non-
policy factors were important.  Rapid inflation, fueled in part by oil price increases, resulted in substantial 
bracket creep, and hence unlegislated, non-cyclical increases in revenue.  These differences show that 




                                                     
10 Auerbach (2000) stresses that many non-policy factors other than changes in overall economic activity affect 
revenues, and thus that the change in cyclically adjusted revenues is a highly imperfect measure of policy-induced 




IV.  THE BEHAVIOR OF OUTPUT FOLLOWING TAX CHANGES OF DIFFERENT TYPES 
 
  The next step is to use our measures of tax changes to examine the relationship between taxes and 
economic activity.  In this section, we examine the behavior of output following exogenous tax changes, 
and compare this behavior with that following tax changes of other types.  Examining how output 
behaves after the exogenous changes should provide the most reliable estimates of the macroeconomic 
effects of tax changes.  Investigating whether the other measures yield similar estimates can show 
whether those measures are significantly correlated with other influences on output, and thus whether it is 
important to focus on the exogenous changes. 
 
A.  Specification 
  We focus on the reduced-form relationship between the various measures of tax changes and the 
growth of real output.  Since the exogenous changes reflect policies adopted for reasons essentially 
unrelated to other factors likely to influence growth, a regression of output growth on these changes 
without any control variables should, in principle, yield unbiased estimates of the impact of changes in the 
level of taxes on output. 
  Our starting specification is therefore very simple:  we regress output growth on a constant and 
the contemporaneous value and twelve lags of our measure of exogenous tax changes.  That is, we 
estimate: 
(1)                                                           , e T b a Y ln t i t
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where ∆ lnY is the growth rate of the chain-type quantity index for GDP and ∆T is our measure of 
exogenous tax changes as a percent of nominal GDP.
11  The data are quarterly.  Since our tax measure is 
available beginning in 1947Q1 and the regression includes twelve lags, the earliest possible starting date 
is 1950Q1.  The final observation is 2006Q2.  In the next section, we consider numerous variations on 
                                                     
11 The data on the quantity index for GDP are from the National Income and Product Accounts, Table 1.1.3 




this specification, including alternative choices of sample periods and specifications that add control 
variables. 
  To see whether the behavior of output following tax changes occurring for other reasons is 
similar to its behavior following exogenous changes, we estimate equation (1) using other tax measures as 
well.  Our broadest alternative measure is the change in real cyclically adjusted revenues, divided by real 
GDP.
12  Our measure of exogenous tax changes includes only a subset of legislated changes, and the 
measure based on cyclically adjusted revenues includes more than just policy-induced changes.  An 
obvious intermediate measure is all legislated changes.  Specifically, we consider the sum of our series for 
exogenous and endogenous tax changes, again expressed as a percent of nominal GDP.  To show more 
clearly whether the economy behaves differently following endogenous changes than following 
exogenous ones, we also estimate equation (1) using only the endogenous changes. 
 
B.  Results 
  Table 1 presents the estimates of equation (1) using our series of exogenous tax changes.  The 
estimated coefficients on the contemporaneous value and the first ten lags of the tax measure are all 
negative.  The first few are small and far from significant.  The coefficients on lags three through nine, 
however, are all substantial, and several are individually significant.  The coefficient on lag ten is smaller, 
and the final two coefficients are substantively and statistically indistinguishable from zero.
13 
Figure 4 summarizes the estimates by showing the implied effect of a tax increase of one percent 
of GDP on the path of real GDP (in logarithms), together with the one-standard-error bands.  The effect is 
steadily down, first slowly and then more rapidly, finally leveling off after ten quarters.  The estimated 
maximum impact is a fall in output of 3.0 percent.  This estimate is overwhelmingly significant (t = ￿3.5).  
                                                     
12 The broadest possible measure would be based on total revenues, not cyclically adjusted revenues.  Since 
revenues rise when output rises, using this measure would introduce an obvious bias toward finding that increases in 
taxes raise output.  And indeed, when we estimate equation (1) using the change in real revenues divided by real 
GDP, the coefficient on the contemporaneous value of ∆T is positive, large, and overwhelmingly significant. 
13 The Durbin-Watson statistic for the regression indicates that the residuals are moderately serially correlated.  
Reestimating the regression correcting for first-order serial correlation (using maximum likelihood) has little impact 




The two-standard-error confidence interval is (￿4.7%,￿1.3%).  In short, tax increases appear to have a 
very large, sustained, and highly significant negative impact on output.  Since most of our exogenous tax 
changes are in fact reductions, the more intuitive way to express this result is that tax cuts have very large 
and persistent positive output effects.
14 
  The results using the change in cyclically adjusted revenues as the tax variable are quite different. 
Table 1 also shows the estimates of equation (1) using this broader measure.
15  As before, the coefficients 
on the tax measure are generally negative.  But the pattern is not as consistent, and the magnitudes are 
considerably smaller.  Panel (a) of Figure 5 shows the implied impact of a tax increase of one percent of 
GDP using this measure.  To facilitate comparison, it also repeats the results using our measure of 
exogenous tax changes.  The estimated maximum effect using the change in cyclically adjusted revenues 
is an output decline of just 1.1 percent (t = ￿2.2), roughly a third as large as that using exogenous tax 
changes.  In addition, the impact is slower.  The point estimates imply that output first rises slightly, 
peaking at 0.3 percent after two quarters, and does not turn negative until four quarters after the tax 
change.  Thus it appears that the inclusion of endogenous policy-induced changes and non-policy 
influences in traditional measures of tax changes leads to considerable underestimates of the effects of tax 
changes on output. 
  To investigate this finding further, in panel (b) of Figure 5 we show the results when we use our 
two alternative measures of tax changes caused by changes in policy.  First, consider the effects when we 
use all legislated tax changes.  As when we use cyclically adjusted revenues, the behavior of output 
following a generic policy-induced tax change is slower and considerably smaller than following the 
exogenous changes.  The estimated maximum effect of a tax increase of one percent of GDP is ￿1.3 
percent (t = ￿2.4).  Thus for this sample and specification, the bias caused by using cyclically adjusted 
                                                     
14 In the baseline regression, we use the variant of our measure of exogenous tax changes that includes the revenue 
effects of any retroactive features of the bills.  When one uses the version that ignores the retroactive features, the 
results are virtually identical.  The estimated maximum impact of a tax increase of one percent of GDP on GDP is   
￿3.1 percent (t = ￿3.5).  Because the retroactive provisions are a genuine feature of these bills, all the regressions 
that follow use the variant of the series that includes these provisions.  
15 Because the measure based on cyclically adjusted revenues is computed in changes, it is first available in 1947Q2.  
We therefore lose the first observation from our sample when we use this measure.  Dropping this observation has 




revenues appears to stem mainly from the inclusion of endogenous policy changes, not from the inclusion 
of outside influences on revenues.   
  Next, consider the behavior of output following an endogenous tax change.  Consistent with the 
previous results, the estimated impact is small and slow.  Output first rises slightly, reaching a maximum 
of 0.4 percent after two quarters, and then falls gradually to ￿0.7 percent after twelve quarters.  None of 
the effects are significant; for example, the t-statistic for the maximum impact is ￿0.9.   
  This first look at the data suggests two conclusions.  First, changes in the level of taxes have large 
effects on economic activity:  following tax changes undertaken for reasons largely unrelated to other 
influences on output, there are large and significant output movements in the opposite direction.  Second, 
how one measures tax changes matters:  using broader measures substantially obscures the impact of tax 
changes on the economy. 
 
C.  A Finer Breakdown of Tax Changes 
  Our endogenous and exogenous categories each consist of more than one type of tax change.  It is 
therefore natural to ask if our findings for the broader categories hold for each type of change within 
them.  For example, perhaps only certain types of endogenous changes yield biased estimates.   
  Panel (a) of Figure 6 displays the results for the two types of endogenous changes.
16  Following a 
spending-driven tax increase, GDP on average rises moderately, reaching a maximum of 0.7 percent after 
two quarters (t = 1.5).  Thereafter the effect fluctuates irregularly around zero and is always far from 
significant.  Thus looking at how the economy behaves after tax changes driven by spending changes 
yields estimates of the effects of tax changes that are starkly different from those based on exogenous tax 
changes.   
The behavior of GDP following countercyclical tax changes, in contrast, is more similar to its 
                                                     
16 Recall that one endogenous change was intended to magnify other influences on the economy, and so does not fit 
into either subcategory.  Since this procyclical change was a small, one-time event, looking at how the economy 
behaved in its wake is not very informative.  We therefore include this change in the endogenous category, but do 




behavior following exogenous changes.  After hovering around zero for a few quarters, GDP falls 
steadily, reaching a low of ￿2.1 percent after nine quarters.  For comparison, recall that the maximum 
impact following an exogenous tax change is ￿3.0 percent after ten quarters.  Because countercyclical tax 
changes are uncommon, the behavior of GDP in their wake is not estimated very precisely.  The t-statistic 
for the estimated effect after nine quarters, for example, is ￿1.4.   
The fact that the point estimates differ only moderately from those for exogenous changes 
suggests that countercyclical fiscal policy is not achieving its intended purpose.  If policymakers were 
successfully adjusting taxes in response to information about other forces affecting the economy, 
countercyclical tax changes would be substantially positively correlated with other influences on output 
growth, and so a regression of growth on the countercyclical changes would yield estimates with a large 
positive bias.  We do not appear to observe this.  This finding is consistent with the often-noted fact that it 
is difficult for fiscal policy to respond quickly to economic developments.  Consider, for example, the two 
largest countercyclical changes in our sample.  The 1968 surcharge was first proposed in January 1967, 
but was not passed until June 1968.  And although less than three months elapsed between the proposal 
and passage of the 1975 tax rebate, the rebate was not proposed until the economy had been in a recession 
for fourteen months. 
  Panel (b) of Figure 6 shows the results for the two types of exogenous changes.  For long-run 
changes, which make up most of this category, the results are quite similar to those for all exogenous 
changes.  For tax increases to deal with an inherited budget deficit, the results are more interesting.  The 
point estimates imply that output does not fall at all following deficit-driven tax increases.  The estimated 
effect peaks at 1.4 percent after two quarters, and then fluctuates around 1 percent.  However, there are 
too few tax changes of this type for the effects to be estimated very precisely.  The maximum t-statistic, 
for example, is just 1.2.  Nonetheless, the estimates are suggestive that tax increases to reduce an inherited 






  The finding that tax increases to reduce the deficit appear to have little negative impact on output 
is particularly surprising given a possible bias in this regression.  Deficit-reduction packages, especially 
later in the sample, often include at least small cuts in spending.  Thus, deficit-driven tax increases are 
potentially correlated with another force likely to depress output.  One might therefore expect the negative 
effects of a tax increase in this regression to be overstated.  That the results nevertheless show a smaller 
output effect could imply that this bias is minimal.  Alternatively, it could suggest that the beneficial 
impact of a deficit-reduction package on expectations or long-term interest rates is substantial. 
 
 
V.  ROBUSTNESS 
 
  The evidence presented thus far suggests that changes in taxes have large effects on output.  In 
this section, we test the robustness of this finding.  We investigate the sensitivity of the results to outliers 
and the sample period.  More importantly, we examine the effects of including numerous control 
variables.  As described above, because our new series on exogenous tax changes was derived to exclude 
changes motivated by the current or projected state of the economy, it is in principle unnecessary to 
include control variables to estimate the effects of tax changes.  But, because our identification of 
motivation could be imperfect, and because the exogenous tax changes could be correlated with other 
influences just by chance, it is useful to see if including other variables affects the results.   
  For the most part, this section focuses on our measure of exogenous tax changes.  In cases where 
the results for the other measures change importantly, or where there is an obvious reason to be concerned 
with those measures, we discuss the results for them as well. 
 
                                                     
17 The deficit-driven tax change most associated with the notion that such changes might have few adverse 
consequences is the 1993 Clinton tax increase.  However, this observation is not driving the estimates.  When it is 




A.  Outliers and Sample Period 
  The most obvious robustness check involves extreme observations.  While large exogenous tax 
changes are surely reasonable observations to consider, it is useful to check whether they are driving the 
results.  To do this, we simply drop one at a time the four largest exogenous tax actions:  those included in 
the Revenue Act of 1948, the Revenue Act of 1964, the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, and the 
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 together with the Jobs and Growth Tax 
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003.
18 
  The results of this exercise suggest that the estimates are quite durable.  For two of the acts, 
excluding the extreme observations has virtually no impact on the estimated cumulative effect of a tax 
change on output.  The maximum effect of a tax increase of one percent of GDP excluding the 1964 
Kennedy-Johnson tax cut is ￿2.8 percent (t = ￿2.8); the maximum effect excluding the 1981 Reagan tax 
cut is ￿2.9 percent (t = ￿3.0).  Recall that for the full sample, the maximum effect is ￿3.0 percent (t =       
￿3.5).  Excluding the 2001 and 2003 Bush tax cuts (jointly) substantially increases the negative impact of 
a tax change.  The maximum effect is now ￿3.6 percent (t = ￿3.8).  Only in the case of the 1948 tax cut 
does excluding the extreme observation weaken the estimated effects noticeably.  But even then, they 
remain large and highly significant.  When the 1948 action is excluded, the implied maximum impact of a 
tax increase of one percent of GDP is ￿2.2 percent (t = ￿2.7).  That leaving out this one action matters 
somewhat it not surprising:  it is the largest exogenous tax change in the postwar era and was followed 
nine quarters later by the start of the Korean War. 
  Another way to address the possible importance of the extreme observations in the early postwar 
era is to start the sample period in 1955Q1.  This shorter sample period leaves out the large 1948 tax cut 
and is safely after the wartime boom in GDP.  Figure 7 shows the cumulative impact of an exogenous tax 
increase when the sample period is 1955Q1 to 2006Q2.  The estimated maximum output effect of a tax 
increase of one percent of GDP is now ￿2.5 percent (t = ￿3.4).   
Shortening the sample period has substantially more effect on the estimates based on broader 
                                                     




measures of tax changes.  Figure 7 also shows the estimated cumulative impact of a tax increase of one 
percent of GDP when the change in real cyclically adjusted revenues is used as the tax variable.  The 
change in the sample period causes the estimates using this measure to move noticeably closer to those 
for the exogenous changes, but the gap remains substantial.  The estimated maximum effect is now a 
change in GDP of ￿1.8 percent, as opposed to ￿2.5 percent for the exogenous changes.  In addition, the 
effects using the change in cyclically adjusted revenues remain noticeably slower than those using 
exogenous changes.  When our measure of all legislated tax changes is used as the tax variable, the results 
for the shorter sample are very similar to those using only the exogenous changes.  Thus for this sample, 
including policy-induced changes motivated by countercyclical considerations or spending changes does 
not appear to cause important bias.  As the results using cyclically adjusted revenues show, including tax 
changes driven by non-policy, non-cyclical factors does, however. 
 
B.  Controlling for the State of the Economy 
  The simplest, and arguably most important, control variable to consider is lagged GDP growth.  
Including several lags of GDP growth should obviously help control for the normal dynamics of output.  
Because many factors affecting output are likely to be serially correlated, including lagged GDP growth is 
also an easy way to control for a multitude of other influences.  Finally, accounting for the state of the 
economy by including lags of GDP growth provides a crucial test for hidden motivation.  One worry is 
that even though policymakers say they are changing taxes for reasons unrelated to the state of the 
economy, perhaps the democratic process makes such changes correlated with economic performance.  
For example, candidates advocating tax cuts may be more likely to win when the economy is weak.  
Thus, perhaps seemingly exogenous tax cuts are more common when output is below normal, and so the 
apparent stimulatory effects of tax cuts are in part simply the usual reversion of output to normal.   
Controlling for numerous lags of GDP growth addresses this possibility. 
  Including lagged GDP growth in our regression is straightforward.  Because the quarterly GDP 




1950Q1 to 2006Q2.  We therefore reestimate equation (1) using twelve lags of our measure of exogenous 
tax changes and eleven lags of GDP growth.  To summarize the results, one now needs to include not 
only the direct effect of the tax changes on output, but also the effects working through lagged output.
19 
  Figure 8 shows the estimated impact on GDP of an exogenous tax increase of one percent of 
GDP, with and without controlling for lagged growth.  The results are very similar.  Controlling for 
lagged GDP growth reduces the maximum effect only trivially, from ￿3.02 percent (t = ￿3.5) to ￿2.95 
percent (t = ￿2.8).     
The specification including lagged growth allows for the possibility of further effects of tax 
changes on output beyond twelve quarters.  The estimates suggest, however, that these effects are minor.  
When we carry the simulation out to 24 quarters, the estimated effect diminishes from ￿2.95 percent in 
quarter 10 to ￿2.6 percent in quarter 15, and then remains between ￿2.6 and ￿2.7 percent.
 20 
Another way to address the possibility that the exogenous tax changes we identify may be 
influenced by the state of the economy is to consider a simple vector autoregression (VAR).  A VAR 
allows the tax changes to respond to output, and it accounts for the normal dynamics of output and the tax 
changes.  We therefore estimate a VAR with two variables, our series of exogenous tax changes and the 
logarithm of GDP.  As in the simple regression, we include twelve lags.  In keeping with our regression 
specification, which allows tax changes to affect output within the quarter, we place the tax series first 
and GDP second. 
  The results provide no evidence that our exogenous tax changes respond to economic conditions.  
The impulse response function of the tax changes to an orthogonalized innovation to GDP is small and 
                                                     
19 Specifically, the estimated impact of the tax change is now the dynamic multiplier accounting for the implied 
changes in the path of lagged GDP growth.  The standard errors are computed by taking 10,000 draws of the 
coefficient vector from a multivariate normal distribution with mean and variance-covariance matrix equal to the 
point estimates and variance-covariance matrix of the regression coefficients.  
20 It is useful to note that controlling for lagged GDP growth is not a solution to the possible bias from using broader 
measures of tax changes.  Many endogenous tax changes, particularly those motivated by spending changes, are not 
responses to the current state of the economy.  As a result, if one regresses GDP growth on twelve lags of the change 
in real cyclically adjusted revenues (as a percent of real GDP) and eleven lags of GDP growth, the results (including 
the effects through lagged output) are very similar to those from the regression not controlling for lagged GDP 
growth, though the standard errors increase sufficiently that none of the effects are significant.  This suggests that 





insignificant at all horizons.  The p-value for the test of the null hypothesis that output does not Granger 
cause the tax changes is 0.49. 
  In addition, the implications of the VAR for the output effects of tax changes are very similar to 
those of the simple regression.  As described above, the fact that tax bills often include retroactive 
components causes our series of exogenous tax changes to be negatively serially correlated.  As a result, a 
one percentage point innovation in our tax series in the VAR is a somewhat different experiment than the 
permanent one percentage point change in taxes we consider in presenting the regression results.  In 
particular, following a one-percentage-point innovation in our series, just over 40 percent of the change is 
reversed the following quarter, with only small and irregular changes after that. 
  Given this difference in the experiments, the output response in the VAR is exactly what one 
would expect.  Following a one-percentage-point innovation in our series, there is a rapid, large, and 
highly significant fall in output, with a time pattern very similar to that implied by the simple regression.  
The t-statistic for the maximum effect is ￿2.8.  The only notable difference is that the effects are roughly 
40 percent smaller than those implied by the regression.  For example, the maximum effect is now ￿1.8 
percent rather than ￿3.0 percent.  This is what one would expect in light of the difference in the 
experiments. 
 
C.  Controlling for Monetary Policy 
  A second type of control variable is an indicator of monetary policy.  Monetary policy shocks are 
an important determinant of short-run fluctuations.  It is therefore important to check that our new 
measure of fiscal shocks does not happen to be correlated with monetary disturbances.  In controlling for 
monetary policy, however, it is important not to control for changes that are responses to the tax changes.  
For example, suppose the response of monetary policy typically mitigates the expansionary effects of tax 
cuts.  In this case, asking how output behaves in the wake of tax cuts holding monetary policy fixed 
would lead to overestimates of the actual effects of the cuts.  Thus what we want to control for are not all 





We consider two measures of such independent changes in monetary policy.  The first is a 
dummy variable for shifts to anti-inflationary monetary policy that we identified in earlier work (Romer 
and Romer, 1989, 1994).  This series has the advantage of covering the full sample, but the disadvantage 
of being fairly crude.  Our second series is a continuous indicator of monetary shocks derived as the 
residuals of a regression of the change in the federal funds rate target on the Federal Reserve￿s internal 
forecasts of inflation and real growth (Romer and Romer, 2004).  This series is available for the period 
1969Q1￿1996Q4.    We control for monetary policy by adding twelve lags of the appropriate measure to 
the regression.
21 
Figure 9 shows the estimated impact of an exogenous tax increase of one percent of GDP on 
GDP, both with and without controlling for monetary policy.  Panel (a) displays the results when the 
dummy variable is used as the monetary policy indicator.  Adding this control reduces the estimated 
impact of tax changes by about twenty percent, but the effect remains very large and highly significant.
22   
Panel (b) considers the continuous measure of monetary policy shocks.  Because of the limited 
availability of this series and the inclusion of lags, the sample period is now 1972Q1￿1996Q4.  For this 
sample, the estimated impact of a tax increase when we do not control for monetary policy is very similar 
to the estimates for the full sample.  The estimated maximum effect is an output decline of 3.1 percent 
after nine quarters rather than 3.0 percent after ten.  Controlling for monetary policy again reduces the 
estimated effect by about twenty percent.  The effect remains statistically significant, but not 
overwhelmingly so; the largest t-statistic is now ￿2.4.  Given that we have discarded over half our sample, 
this is not surprising. 
 
                                                     
21 We convert each series from monthly to quarterly in the obvious way:  the quarterly dummy is set to one in any 
quarter that contains a month when there was a shift to anti-inflationary policy, and the quarterly observations for 
the shock series are the averages of the corresponding monthly observations. 
22 Excluding the Korean War has slightly more impact on this experiment than on the others we consider.  The 
estimated maximum impact of an exogenous tax increase of one percent of GDP on GDP in the regression including 
the dummy variable estimated over the period 1955Q1￿2006Q2 is ￿1.8 percent (t = ￿2.5).  Without the control, the 




D.  Controlling for Government Spending 
  Government spending, especially large military actions, can have a powerful impact on output.  
Thus in examining the effects of tax changes, another candidate control variable is changes in government 
spending.  As before, if we have constructed our measure of exogenous tax changes correctly, controlling 
for spending changes is not necessary.
23  But, chance correlation is always a possibility.  And, to the 
degree that deficit-driven tax increases are parts of budget packages that include spending cuts, there is 
reason to fear there is some systematic correlation as well. 
  We use as our measure of spending changes the change in real federal total gross government 
expenditures less interest payments, divided by real GDP.
24  The expenditure data start in 1947Q1.   
Therefore, as with lagged GDP, we can include eleven lags of the change in spending and retain the 
baseline sample period.  We also include the contemporaneous value. 
  Panel (a) of Figure 10 shows that controlling for changes in government spending has little 
impact on the estimated effects of exogenous tax changes.  The maximum effect of a tax increase of one 
percent of GDP is now an output decline of 2.9 percent, which is only slightly smaller than the estimate 
from the simple regression.  The effect remains highly statistically significant, with a maximum t-statistic 
of ￿3.4. 
  Panel (b) shows that controlling for changes in spending has a moderate impact on the estimated 
behavior of output following tax increases for deficit reduction.  The maximum impact of a deficit-driven 
tax increase of one percent of GDP on GDP rises from 1.1 percent (t = 0.5) to 1.6 percent (t = 0.8).  While 
the difference is far from significant, it is in the direction one would expect if there were occasionally 
spending cuts at the same time as deficit-driven tax increases.  Controlling for the depressing effects of 
the spending cuts suggests that the deficit-driven tax increases have a larger positive impact on output. 
  One reason that broader measures of tax changes yield biased estimates of the effects of tax 
                                                     
23 Further, as with monetary policy, if exogenous tax changes affect output in part by changing the path of spending, 
controlling for spending changes will lead to misestimates of the overall output effects of tax changes. 
24 The government expenditure data that we use are from the National Income and Product Accounts, Table 3.2 
(downloaded 9/17/06).  We calculate federal total gross expenditures less interest payments as current expenditures 
+ gross government investment + capital transfer payments + net purchases of nonproduced assets ￿ interest 




changes on output is that they include tax changes motivated by spending changes.  A natural question is 
whether including a measure of spending changes in the regressions using these broader measures reduces 
this bias.  To test for this possibility, we reestimate equation (1) using both the change in cyclically 
adjusted revenues and all legislated tax changes, including the contemporaneous value and eleven lags of 
the spending variable.  We find that controlling for spending changes is at best only a partial fix.  For the 
change in cyclically adjusted revenues, including spending makes the estimated effect of a tax increase on 
GDP more negative, as one would expect if the omission of spending changes biased the estimates toward 
zero.  The change is very small, however, and the estimates remain far smaller than those estimated using 
the exogenous tax changes.  For all legislated tax changes, controlling for spending has a larger effect.  
The inclusion of government spending increases the estimated impact of tax changes by about fifty 
percent.  The estimates remain substantially smaller than those using only exogenous changes, but about 
half the gap is eliminated.   
  The bottom line of the robustness analysis is that our baseline results are very durable.
25  None of 
the robustness checks greatly lessens the estimated negative impact of an exogenous tax increase on 
output.  At the same time, shortening the sample period and including sensible control variables typically 
reduces the estimated cumulative impact slightly.  Whereas in the baseline regression the maximum effect 
of a tax increase of one percent of GDP is a fall in GDP of 3.0 percent, in many of the robustness 






                                                     
25 We have also investigated the effects of controlling for the contemporaneous value and eleven lags of the 
percentage change in the relative price of crude oil; for the contemporaneous value and twelve lags of a dummy 
variable for whether the president is a Democrat; and for the contemporaneous value and twelve lags of dummies for 




VI.  EXTENSIONS 
 
In this section, we extend our results in four directions.  First, we examine whether the output 
effects of a legislated tax change are more closely related to the enactment of the legislation or to the 
change actually taking effect.  Second, we ask whether the effects of tax changes have changed over time.  
Third, we present some evidence concerning the issue of whether the relatively long-lived output effects 
that we find reflect persistent departures of output from its normal level or changes in the normal level of 
output.  Finally, we examine how tax changes affect the components of output, and in doing so provide 
some evidence about why the output effects of tax changes are so large. 
 
A.  Role of Expectations 
  In deriving our measure of fiscal shocks, we date tax changes when they actually took effect.  A 
tax law that changed liabilities in a series of steps is therefore recorded as a sequence of fiscal shocks.  
Our empirical analysis then looks at the output effects of these actual changes in taxes.  This approach is 
almost surely appropriate.  As discussed in Section II, there is considerable evidence that consumers do 
not smooth consumption in response to moderate anticipated variations in taxes.  And, any supply-side 
effects of tax changes are likely to occur when marginal tax rates actually change. 
  However, expectations could also matter.  Under the permanent income hypothesis, consumers 
should react to news about a sequence of future tax increases by immediately reducing consumption.  
They should then not respond further when tax liabilities actually change.  Other expectations effects are 
also possible.  News of a tax increase may improve people￿s expectations about the government￿s future 
fiscal health.  This could have a positive impact on confidence, and hence on spending and output.  News 
of an increase in marginal tax rates could cause intertemporal substitution toward income generation 
before the tax increase.  Like the confidence effect, this effect goes in the opposite direction from the 
permanent income effect. 




the perceived probability of a tax change and the present value of the possible action.  As a step in that 
direction, we calculate the present value of the legislated tax changes included in a given bill at the time 
of passage.  This calculation adjusts the timing of the revenue effects of an action to be much closer to the 
time the news of the action became available.  We can then investigate the response of output to this 
alternative measure of fiscal shocks. 
  The calculation of the present values is straightforward.  We date an action in whatever quarter 
the bill was signed.  We discount the future changes using the three-year Treasury bill rate.
26  When the 
individual actions for a given act have multiple motivations, we calculate a separate present value for 
each type of motivation.
27 
  We then augment our regression to include not only the contemporaneous value and twelve lags 
of our baseline measure of tax changes, which dates changes in the quarter they actually took effect, but 
also the contemporaneous value and twelve lags of the alternative present-value measure, which dates tax 
changes in the quarter of passage.  This specification allows us to test whether the data prefer one timing 
assumption to the other, and whether there is a separate expectations effect.  We estimate the regression 
over the full postwar sample using both exogenous tax actions and the subset of exogenous actions 
motivated by a desire to deal with an inherited budget deficit. 
  The results using exogenous tax changes are shown in panel (a) of Figure 11.  The solid line 
shows the cumulative impact on GDP of a tax increase of one percent of GDP dated in the quarter the 
change took effect, holding constant the behavior of the present-value series; the dashed line shows the 
                                                     
26 The data are from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, www.bog.gov, series 
H15/H15/RIFLGFCY03_N.M (downloaded 5/18/07).  The data do not begin until 1953Q4.  We extend the series 
back to 1947Q1 using the 3-month Treasury bill rate (series H15/H15/RIFSGFSM03_N.M).  The two interest rates 
differ by only 0.3 percentage points in 1953Q4. 
27 One complication that arises in calculating present values involves some of the tax changes classified as deficit-
driven.  In our baseline series, a tax increase that is legislated in a bill increasing spending, but that occurs more than 
a year after the spending increase that was its ultimate motivation, is classified as deficit-driven.  This makes sense 
in the framework where output reacts to the actual change in taxes because the tax change is substantially after the 
spending change.  But, in a framework emphasizing news, the future tax change should be treated as spending-
driven.  For this reason, we reclassify six deficit-driven tax changes as spending-driven.  These observations are the 
1954Q1 increase from the Social Security Amendments of 1950; the 1954Q1 decrease from PL125; the 1960Q1 
increase from the Social Security Amendments of 1958; the 1963Q1 increase from the Social Security Amendments 
of 1961; the 1971Q1 increase from the Social Security Amendments of 1967; and the 1978Q1 increase from the 




impact of a present-value tax increase of one percent of GDP dated in the quarter of passage, holding 
constant the behavior of actual tax changes.   
  The estimated impact of a tax change dated in the quarter it actually went into effect in this 
expanded specification is very similar to that for our baseline specification (given in Figure 4).  The 
maximum impact is ￿3.0 percent (t = ￿2.4).  That the results do not change noticeably when the measure 
of news is added suggests that output responds to tax changes when they take effect. 
  The impact of a present-value tax increase dated in the quarter of passage is initially small and 
then consistently positive.  The maximum impact is 1.1 percent (t = 1.7).  That the impact is not 
significant at conventional levels suggests that the news effects of tax changes may be of secondary 
importance.  That the point estimates are positive is perhaps more surprising.  This is certainly not the 
sign predicted by the permanent income hypothesis.  It is consistent with news of a tax increase having a 
positive effect on consumer confidence or an intertemporal substitution effect on labor supply. 
  Panel (b) shows the estimated cumulative impacts in the expanded specification using only 
deficit-driven tax actions.  For this subset of exogenous tax changes there is somewhat more evidence of a 
meaningful news effect.  First, the impact of a tax increase dated in the quarter it took effect changes 
substantially between the baseline and the expanded specification.  For the baseline specification the 
impact is consistently positive, though imprecisely estimated.  The impact in the expanded specification is 
largely negative, though still imprecisely estimated:  the maximum impact is ￿1.5 percent (t = ￿0.8).  This 
change could indicate that the present value dated at the time of passage is an important explanatory 
variable.  When it is included, tax changes dated at the time they took effect have the more conventional 
negative effect. 
  The estimated impact of an increase in present value dated at the time of passage is again 
positive.  However, it is larger for deficit-driven tax changes than for exogenous changes more generally.  
The maximum impact is 2.2 percent (t = 1.6).  This finding may suggest that tax increases explicitly for 
deficit reduction have a particularly large positive impact on confidence.  However, the effect is not 




  Overall, these results suggest that our baseline method of dating tax changes in the quarter in 
which liabilities actually changed is largely appropriate.  There is a significant negative relationship 
between exogenous tax increases dated this way and output that is robust to the inclusion of a proxy for 
fiscal news.  On the other hand, there is some evidence that expectations effects could also exist, 
especially for the subset of exogenous tax changes motivated by concern for an inherited budget deficit.   
 
B.  Changes Over Time 
  There are several reasons that the aggregate effects of tax changes might have become smaller 
over time.  First, monetary policy has come to play an increasingly central role in stabilization policy.  
Thus the Federal Reserve may have done more to counteract the effects of tax changes in the later part of 
the sample.  Second, there has been more concern about the United States￿s long-run fiscal health in 
recent decades.  As a result, the direct contractionary effects of tax increases may have been offset to a 
greater extent by effects operating via confidence.  And third, the increasing depth and scope of financial 
markets could have made the dependence of consumer spending on disposable income smaller later in the 
sample.  On the first two of these dimensions, there were significant changes around 1980, which is also 
roughly the midpoint of our sample.  We therefore investigate the effects of splitting the sample at the end 
of 1980. 
  Figure 12 shows that the effects of tax changes appear to have become considerably smaller over 
time.  For the early period, the estimated maximum effect of an exogenous tax increase of one percent of 
GDP is a fall in output of 3.9 percent.  For the later period, it is a fall of 2.3 percent.  Starting the early 
sample in 1955Q1 yields a decline similar to that obtained using 1950Q1 to 1980Q4. 
  Despite the large difference in the point estimates, the results do not provide overwhelming 
evidence that the effects of fiscal policy have changed over time.  For the full sample, the largest 
t-statistic for the difference in the effects is 1.3.  Excluding the Korean War period, however, increases it 





  The other important feature of these results is that the impact of tax changes remains large and 
highly significant for the later period.  For the later sample, the estimated maximum effect of a tax 
increase of one percent of GDP on output is ￿2.3 percent, with a t-statistic of ￿3.3. 
 
C.  Why Are the Effects So Persistent? 
  One striking feature of our results is that the estimated effect of tax changes on output shows little 
tendency to return to zero at longer horizons.  In both the baseline specification and most of the 
robustness tests, the effect does not reach its maximum until more than two years after the tax change, and 
it weakens only trivially over the next few quarters. 
  At a general level, there are two possible explanations for this pattern.  Tax changes could have 
large supply-side effects; that is, they could have large effects on the economy￿s normal, flexible-price 
level of output.  In this view, the important effects of tax changes, at least at moderate horizons, are on 
incentives and productivity rather than on disposable income.  Alternatively, tax changes could have 
highly persistent demand-side effects; that is, their impact on the gap between actual and normal output 
could be very long-lasting.  In this view, adjustment to the economy￿s flexible-price equilibrium is slow.  
Although this idea is not appealing theoretically, there is considerable support for the hypothesis that 
macroeconomic adjustment is sluggish.  There is strong evidence that inflation is much more persistent 
than baseline models predict (for example, Fuhrer, 1997, and Rudd and Whelan, 2006).  And estimates of 
the real effects of monetary policy, which on theoretical grounds should be neutral in the long run, often 
suggest considerable persistence (for example, Bernanke and Mihov, 1998, and Romer and Romer, 2004). 
  One way to try to distinguish between these two views is to directly estimate the output effects at 
longer horizons.  If the persistent output effects reflect changes in normal output, there is little reason to 
expect them to dissipate.  If they reflect long-lasting departures of output from normal, on the other hand, 
one would expect them to fade.  Unfortunately, this approach yields little information.  We have 
experimented with including up to twenty lags of our measure of exogenous tax changes in the baseline 




but then strengthen again in quarters 15 to 20.  Because the standard errors rise as the horizon increases, 
neither the hypothesis of no reversion to trend nor the hypothesis of substantial trend reversion can be 
rejected. 
  Because this direct test is inconclusive, we examine the behavior of two other variables.  The first 
is inflation.  If the fall in output in response to a tax increase reflects a fall in normal output, there is no 
particular reason for inflation to change following a tax increase.  But if it reflects a fall in output relative 
to its flexible-price level, one would expect inflation to fall. 
  The second variable is the unemployment rate.  If a tax increase reduces output by lowering 
normal output, it is unlikely that there would be a substantial increase in unemployment.  Changes in 
productivity, labor force participation, and hours of work all appear more likely channels through which a 
tax change could affect normal output than large, rapid changes in the natural rate of unemployment.  
Since unemployment is highly cyclical, however, the view that the output decline reflects a temporary 
departure of output from normal predicts a substantial increase in the unemployment rate. 
  We therefore reestimate equation (1) using both the change in the inflation rate and the change in 
the unemployment rate as the dependent variable, and using our measure of exogenous tax changes as the 
independent variable.
28  Because the dependent variables are expressed as differences, the cumulative 
effects show the impacts of a tax increase of one percent of GDP on the levels of the inflation rate and the 
unemployment rate.  These responses are shown in Figure 13. 
  Panel (a) shows that inflation appears to fall substantially.  The point estimates show the impact 
reaching ￿2.2 percentage points after ten quarters, then spiking down to ￿3.1 percentage points in quarter 
11 before returning to ￿2.2 percentage points in quarter 12. 
  One way to put these numbers in context is to consider a traditional Phillips curve that relates the 
change in inflation to the output gap.  The estimated cumulative impact shown in Figure 4 suggests that in 
response to a tax increase of one percent of GDP, over the next three years output is on average 1.8 
                                                     
28 The inflation rate is measured as the change in the logarithm of the chain-type price index for GDP.  The 
unemployment data are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, www.bls.gov, series LNS14000000 (downloaded 




percent lower than it otherwise would have been.  Standard estimates of the Phillips curve suggest that if 
output is one percent below normal for a year, inflation falls by 0.25 to 0.50 percentage points (Fuhrer, 
1997; Gordon, 1997).  Thus, if the output effects of tax changes were entirely departures of output from 
normal, one would expect inflation to fall by 1.35 to 2.7 percentage points.  The estimates suggest that 
inflation falls by at least that much.  The one important caveat to this discussion is that the response of 
inflation to the tax cut is not precisely estimated.  For example, there is only one quarter for which the 
null hypothesis of no effect can be rejected. 
  Panel (b) shows that a tax increase is followed by a large and highly significant rise in the 
unemployment rate.  The peak effect is an increase of 1.1 percentage points after twelve quarters, with a t-
statistic of 3.1.  The size of the response is again consistent with what one would expect if the output 
declines reflected only departures of output from its flexible-price level.  The estimated output effect after 
twelve quarters is a decrease of 2.9 percent, suggesting an Okun￿s law coefficient of 2.6.  This is 
consistent with conventional estimates (for example, Attfield and Silverstone, 1996). 
  Thus, the behavior of inflation and unemployment are exactly what one would expect if the 
estimated long-lasting output effects of tax changes represented persistent departures of output from its 
flexible-price level.  The evidence is not definitive, however:  the inflation response is not precisely 
estimated, and it is conceivable that tax changes have large effects on the natural rate of unemployment. 
 
D.  The Components of Output and the Transmission Mechanism 
  Our results suggest that exogenous tax increases have a strong negative effect on output.  An 
obvious question is whether we can go beyond the reduced-form results and shed light on how or why 
fiscal changes have such pronounced effects.  To that end, we examine the response of the various 
components of GDP, such as consumption and investment, to our new measure of exogenous tax 
changes.
29  We also look at the response of the components of GDP to the subcategory of our exogenous 
actions aimed at reducing an inherited budget deficit.  These actions are the ones that might most 
                                                     




plausibly have special effects through their impact on expectations and interest rates.  We examine 
whether certain components respond unusually to this kind of fiscal shock. 
  Our specification mirrors that in Section IV.   We regress the growth rate of a component of GDP 
on a constant and the contemporaneous value and twelve lags of our measure of exogenous tax changes 
(or the subset of these changes aimed at deficit reduction).
30  The regressions are run over the full postwar 
sample (1950Q1￿2006Q2).   
Responses to Exogenous Tax Changes.  Panel (a) of Figure 14 shows the estimated responses of 
consumption and investment to an exogenous tax increase.  For comparison, it also repeats the results for 
GDP.  The key results are that both components fall, and that the fall in investment is much larger than 
that in consumption.  In response to a tax increase of one percent of GDP, the maximum fall in personal 
consumption expenditures is 2.6 percent (t = ￿3.8), just slightly less than the maximum fall in GDP.  The 
maximum fall in gross private domestic investment is 12.6 percent (t = ￿2.9).
31 
  Conventional models predict that a tax increase lowers interest rates.  Thus, the fact that 
investment falls so strongly in response to a tax increase suggests that conventional interest rate effects 
are not key.  One possibility is that interest rates do not respond much, or respond perversely, to tax 
changes.
32  The strong response of investment to tax changes is consistent with research showing that 
investment depends strongly on cash flow and overall economic conditions.
33 
  The strong negative relationship between tax changes and investment also helps to explain the 
size of our estimated overall effect on output.  Recall that we find that a tax increase of one percent of 
GDP lowers GDP by about 3 percent.  An important part of that effect appears to be due to the procyclical 
                                                     
30 The particular output series that we use are the chain-type quantity indexes from the National Income and Product 
Accounts, Table 1.1.3 (downloaded 9/15/06). 
31 Blanchard and Perotti also find that investment falls in response to their measure of a positive tax shock, and that 
the percentage fall in investment is substantially larger than the percentage fall in consumption. 
32 Our series on exogenous tax changes is not well suited to measuring the impact of tax changes on interest rates.  
Our series identifies the times when tax changes actually affected liabilities (or, in the variant we consider in Part A 
of this section, when legislation changing taxes was enacted), but it does not indicate when there was news that a tax 
change would occur.  Since interest rates presumably respond to news, they are likely to change before liabilities 
actually change (and before the legislation changing taxes is actually enacted). 






  Panel (b) of Figure 14 shows the estimated response of the three categories of consumption.  
Personal consumption expenditures on both nondurables and services fall relatively little:  the maximum 
impact is ￿2.0 percent (t = ￿3.3) for nondurables and ￿1.5 percent (t = ￿3.3) for services.  Expenditures on 
durables fall substantially more:  the maximum impact is ￿8.6 percent (t = ￿2.6).  As with investment, the 
fact that durables purchases respond so negatively to a tax increase suggests that the general cyclical 
volatility of durables swamps any countervailing interest rate effect. 
  Panel (c) shows the estimated responses of nonresidential and residential fixed investment.  It 
also repeats the effect for gross private domestic investment, so that one can implicitly see the response of 
inventory investment.
35  Fixed investment of both types falls less than total investment, suggesting that 
inventory investment falls particularly strongly.  But, fixed investment responds sharply as well.  The 
maximum effect is ￿6.2 percent (t = ￿2.7) for nonresidential fixed investment and ￿8.2 percent (t = ￿2.1) 
for residential fixed investment. 
  The responses of imports and exports are shown in panel (d).  These responses have the signs 
predicted by textbook models.  Exports appear to rise substantially in response to a tax increase, but the 
effect is not statistically different from zero.  The maximum impact is 2.6 percent (t = 1.2).  Imports fall 
significantly.  The maximum impact is ￿10.1 percent (t = ￿2.8).  The implied rise in net exports is 
consistent with the tax increase lowering interest rates and hence capital inflows.  But the fact that the 
effect is so much stronger for imports suggests that the fall in income may be more important than the 
                                                     
34 Exogenous tax changes sometimes include changes in the investment tax credit or in the tax treatment of 
depreciation that directly affect incentives for investment.  Thus another possibility is that the sharp estimated 
response of investment reflects the impact of these incentives.  However, cases of substantial exogenous tax changes 
accompanied by important changes in tax incentives for investment are uncommon.  By far the largest case occurred 
with the Reagan tax cuts in the early 1980s.  The second largest case was the change in depreciation guidelines and 
adoption of an investment tax credit in 1962.  To address the possibility that such incentives are a crucial source of 
the investment response, we reestimate the effect of exogenous tax changes on investment with the series for 
exogenous tax changes set to zero over the periods 1962Q3￿1963Q1 and 1981Q3￿1984Q1.  This change lowers the 
estimated investment response only slightly. 




interest rate/exchange rate linkage.
36 
Responses to Deficit-Driven Tax Changes.  In Section IV, we found that the response of GDP 
to a deficit-driven tax increase is positive, though not significant.  Since the literature has suggested that 
deficit-reducing fiscal reforms may have such positive effects, we look at the response of the components 
of GDP to deficit-driven tax changes. 
  The results are shown in Figure 15.  Panel (a) shows the results for GDP and its two main 
components, consumption and investment.  For consumption, the effect of a deficit-driven tax increase is 
mildly positive for the first two quarters and then mildly negative.  None of the estimated effects have a t-
statistic greater than 0.7 in absolute value.  For investment, the results are strikingly different from those 
for consumption, and from those for investment using all exogenous tax changes.  Deficit-driven tax 
increases appear to raise gross private domestic investment substantially over the first three quarters.  The 
effect then gradually declines over the next seven quarters.  While none of the estimated effects are 
different from zero at conventional significance levels, the t-statistics on the initial positive impacts are all 
greater than 1.5.
37 
  Panel (b) shows the estimated responses of the three types of consumption.  The effects are very 
imprecisely estimated, so none of the effects are statistically significant.  The point estimates, however, 
differ substantially.  For both nondurables and services, the estimated effects are fairly consistently 
negative, though smaller than when all exogenous tax changes are used as the independent variable.  For 
durables, the estimated response is typically positive and of moderate size, though it fluctuates somewhat. 
  Panel (c) shows the estimated responses of total investment, residential fixed investment, and 
nonresidential fixed investment.  Residential fixed investment rises substantially in the first two quarters 
                                                     
36 We also estimate the responses of exports and imports splitting the sample after the end of fixed exchange rates in 
1973Q1.  Consistent with standard models, the estimated impact of a tax increase on exports in the fixed exchange 
rate period is small, irregularly signed, and highly insignificant.  The estimated decline in imports is smaller under 
flexible exchange rates than under fixed exchange rates.  Although the response of exchange rates should magnify 
the decline in the later period, the fact that the output response is considerably smaller in that period works in the 
opposite direction.  Thus the smaller decline in the second part of the sample is not surprising. 
37 When the sample is restricted to the post-Korea period (1955Q1￿2006Q2), the results are qualitatively similar, but 
less dramatic.  The maximum impact of a deficit-driven tax increase of one percent of GDP on consumption is ￿0.8 




after a deficit-driven tax increase, and the effect is marginally significant.  The estimated maximum effect 
is 10.4 percent (t = 1.9).  Nonresidential fixed investment rises as well, but much less sharply, and the 
effects are imprecisely estimated.  The behavior of total investment is similar to the behavior of 
residential fixed investment. 
  The pattern of responses to exogenous tax changes as a whole seemed to indicate that the 
behavior of expenditures on durables and investment was just a more extreme version of the other types 
of consumption.  For deficit-driven tax changes, in contrast, investment and consumer spending on 
durables move in the opposite direction from consumer spending on nondurables and services.  This 
could suggest that interest rates move particularly strongly in response to deficit-driven tax changes.  It 
could also suggest an important role for confidence.  Perhaps deficit-driven tax changes make consumers 
more optimistic and thus cause them to buy more durables and to spur residential investment.
38  
Neither the interest-rate story nor the confidence story is without weaknesses.  If interest rates 
move particularly much in response to deficit-driven tax changes, one might expect nonresidential fixed 
investment to respond more forcefully.  If confidence is the crucial link, why does consumer spending on 
nondurables and services still fall? 
The estimated responses of imports and exports to a deficit-driven tax change may be most 
consistent with a combination of the two views.  Panel (d) shows that both exports and imports rise, 
though again the responses are not significantly different from zero.  If all that were happening were a 
large fall in interest rates in response to the tax increase, one would expect depreciation of the dollar to 
raise exports and lower imports.  That imports rise in response to a deficit-driven tax increase (but fall 
substantially in response to a generic exogenous tax increase) suggests a positive confidence effect.  This 
could be consistent with the results for the components of consumption, because a large fraction of 
imports are consumer durables. 
 
                                                     
38 Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) argue that the confidence effect explains why dramatic fiscal reforms have been 




VII.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
  This paper investigates the causes and consequences of changes in the level of taxation in the 
postwar United States.  In terms of causes, we find that despite the complexity of the legislative process, 
most significant tax changes have a dominant motivation that fits fairly clearly into one of four categories:  
counteracting other influences on the economy, paying for increases in government spending (or lowering 
taxes in conjunction with reductions in spending), addressing an inherited budget deficit, and promoting 
long-run growth.  The last two motivations are essentially unrelated to other factors influencing output, 
and so policy actions taken because of them can be used to estimate the effects of tax changes on output. 
  We also find that the motivations for tax changes have changed substantially over time.   
Countercyclical changes were frequent from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, but were unheard of before 
that time and from the mid-1970s until 2001.  Tax changes motivated by spending changes were 
commonplace in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, but have virtually disappeared since then.  Tax increases to 
address inherited deficits were common from the late 1970s to the early 1990s, but rare before and after 
this period.  Only tax changes motivated by long-run considerations have been a constant feature of the 
fiscal landscape since World War II. 
  In terms of consequences, our results indicate that tax changes have very large effects on output.  
Our baseline specification suggests that an exogenous tax increase of one percent of GDP lowers real 
GDP by roughly three percent.  Our many robustness checks for the most part point to a slightly smaller 
decline, but one that is still well over two percent.  The output effects are highly persistent.  The behavior 
of inflation and unemployment suggests that this persistence reflects long-lasting departures of output 
from its flexible-price level, not large effects of tax changes on the flexible-price level of output.  We also 
find that the output effects of tax changes are much more closely tied to the actual changes in taxes than 
to news about future changes, and that investment falls sharply in response to exogenous tax increases.  
Indeed, the strong response of investment helps to explain why the output consequences of tax changes 




We also examine the behavior of output following changes in other measures of taxes.  The 
estimated output effects obtained using broader measures of tax changes, such as the change in cyclically 
adjusted revenues or all legislated tax changes, are substantially smaller than those obtained using our 
measure of exogenous tax changes.  Thus, failing to account for the reasons for tax changes can lead to 
substantially biased estimates of the macroeconomic effects of fiscal actions.  We also find that the 
behavior of output following countercyclical tax changes is only moderately different from that following 
exogenous actions.  This suggests that policymakers￿ efforts to adjust taxes to offset anticipated changes 
in private economic activity have been largely unsuccessful.  Finally, we find suggestive evidence that tax 
increases to reduce an inherited budget deficit do not have the large output costs associated with other 
exogenous tax increases.  This is consistent with the idea that deficit-driven tax increases may have 
important expansionary effects through expectations and long-term interest rates, or through confidence. 
  In considering the implications of these findings, it is important to note that our estimates are not 
highly precise.  The overall estimates of the effects on output are overwhelmingly significant, but the 
confidence interval is substantial.  And when we ask narrower questions ￿ such as how a volatile 
component of output, such as investment, responds to tax changes, or how output behaves following a 
narrowly defined type of tax change, such as a deficit-driven change ￿ the confidence interval is generally 
quite wide. 
  Although we place great emphasis on identifying tax changes that occur for reasons largely 
unrelated to other influences on output, there is an important sense in which this study is not in the 
￿natural experiment￿ tradition.  Rather than considering only a small fraction of tax changes, we examine 
all major postwar tax changes that resulted from policy actions, and we conclude that a substantial 
fraction of them can be used to estimate the effects of tax changes on output.  Thus, the scope for 
increasing the precision of the estimates of the short-run and medium-run macroeconomic effects of tax 
changes appears limited.  One could imagine improving the revenue estimates or finding better control 
variables, but the potential improvement through these channels is likely to be small. 




importance of the characteristics of tax changes for their macroeconomic effects.  There are strong 
reasons to expect the effects of a tax change on output to depend on such features of the change as its 
perceived permanence, its impact on marginal tax rates, and how it affects the tax treatment of 
investment.  Thus it is natural to ask whether the output consequences of tax changes depend not only on 
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Exhibit 1 
Narrative Analysis of a Countercyclical Tax Change 
 
 
Tax Reduction Act of 1975 
 
 Signed  3/29/75 
  1975Q2   ￿$58.1 billion  (Endogenous; Countercyclical) 
  1975Q3   +45.3 billion  (Endogenous; Countercyclical) 
 
The Tax Reduction Act of 1975 was a change in taxes that was made to try to return economic growth to 
normal.  In early 1975, growth was weak and expected to remain weak in the absence of changes in policy.  The 
1975 Economic Report stated, ￿As 1975 begins, ￿ production and employment are declining sharply.  ￿ It is quite 
likely ￿ that the contraction of business activity and rising unemployment will continue for several more months￿ 
(p. 19).  Likewise, the President￿s Annual Budget Message to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1976 declared:  ￿It must be 
clearly understood that these problems are serious and that strong remedies are fully justified.  The economy is now 
in a recession￿ (2/3/75, p. 2).  
The administration therefore proposed a major tax cut ￿[t]o provide support for the economy￿ (1975 
Economic Report, p. 20).  However, the Economic Report was explicit that the tax cut would, at best, merely 
mitigate the expected decline:  ￿The tax cut will not prevent a decline in real output from 1974 to 1975 but it will 
reduce the extent of the year-over-year decline￿ (p. 20).  Presidential speeches confirm the view that the tax cut was 
designed to return growth to normal.  In his Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress Reporting on the State 
of the Union, President Ford stated:  ￿Cutting taxes now is essential if we are to turn the economy around.  A tax cut 
offers the best hope of creating more jobs￿ (1/15/75, p. 2).  Likewise, in the Annual Budget Message, he said:  
￿These policies call for decisive action to restore economic growth￿ and ￿include a one-time $16 billion tax cut ￿ 
to stimulate economic recovery￿ (2/3/75, p. 2).  In his Address to the Nation Upon Signing the Tax Reduction Act of 
1975, Ford again said:  ￿Our country needs the stimulus and the support of a tax cut and needs it now￿ (3/29/75, p. 
2).  He said that though the tax cut was somewhat larger than he originally proposed, ￿the $23 billion tax reduction 
is within reason￿ (p. 1).  He mainly lamented that the bill included ￿a lot of extraneous changes in our tax laws￿ and 
said, ￿This is no way to legislate fundamental tax reforms￿ (p. 1). 
Congressional documents also suggest that the act was motivated by a desire to return growth to normal.  
The House report gave as the prime motivation for the bill the need ￿to check the drastic downward slide in our 
economy and to restore economic growth￿ (94
th Congress, 1
st Session, House of Representatives Report No. 94-19, 
2/25/75, p. 5).  It also stated:  ￿The overall tax cut provided by your committee￿s bill is larger than the $16 billion 
tax cut recommended by the administration.  However, your committee believes that the larger tax cut is more 
appropriate in the present situation, because the economic situation has deteriorated and forecasts of future 
economic activity in absence of remedial action are more pessimistic than at the time the administration presented its 
recommendations￿ (p. 8).  This suggests that even the cuts beyond what the president proposed were aimed at 
securing normal, not supranormal growth. 
  Because the act was designed to stop the decline and return growth to normal, we classify it as an 
endogenous, countercyclical fiscal action. 
  Our sources give several figures for the size of the tax cut, all of them quite similar (Economic Report, 
1976, pp. 48, 50-51; 1977, p. 75; Address to the Nation Upon Signing the Tax Reduction Act of 1975, 3/29/75, p. 1; 
1977 Budget, p. 44).  One very clear statement of the size and timing comes from the 1976 Economic Report.  It 
stated:  ￿In all, the Tax Reduction Act of 1975 lowered receipts by around $42 billion at an annual rate in the second 
quarter of 1975, but most of this drop was temporary.  The tax cuts that remained in effect during the last half of 
1975 amounted to around $15 billion (annual rate)￿ (p. 51).  Translated into changes at an annual rate, these figures 
imply a tax cut of $42 billion in 1975Q2 and an increase of $27 billion in 1975Q3.  These numbers, however, are for 
receipts, not liabilities, and do not appear to take into account the fact that the act not only included the rebate of 
1974 taxes, but also a retroactive cut to January 1975. 
  The House report and the Conference report on the bill gave detailed revenue estimates.  The final bill 
included a rebate of $8.125 billion of 1974 taxes (House Report No. 94-19, Table 1, p. 17; Congressional Record, 
94
th Congress, 1
st Session, Vol. 121￿Part 7, 3/26/75, p. 8880).  Since the act was signed at the end of March, we 
date this as occurring in 1975Q2.  At an annual rate, this was an endogenous tax cut of $32.5 billion.  The  
 
 
Conference report showed additional net tax cuts in 1975Q2 of $12.8 billion at an annual rate.
a  Because these cuts 
were retroactive to January 1, 1975, this implies an additional tax cut in 1975Q2 of $12.8 billion.  Therefore, there 
was a total endogenous tax change in 1975Q2 of ￿$32.5 billion minus $12.8 billion minus $12.8 billion, or ￿$58.1 
billion.  Then, in 1975Q3 when the rebate and the retroactive tax cut disappeared, there was an endogenous tax 
increase of $32.5 billion plus $12.8 billion, or $45.3 billion.  These numbers, while somewhat larger than those in 
the Economic Report, are broadly consistent.  If the retroactive feature (but not the rebate) is ignored, the tax change 
would be ￿$45.3 billion in 1975Q2 and +$32.5 billion in 1975Q3, which is even closer to the Economic Report 
numbers. 
  The House report showed the revenue effects in 1976 as ￿$1.5 billion, implying a substantial tax increase in 
1976Q1 (House Report No. 94-19, Table 1, p. 17).  This is consistent with the tax cut being explicitly temporary.  
However, its provisions were extended and enlarged by the Revenue Adjustment Act of 1975, so the legislated tax 
increase did not take place. 
  Almost all the major provisions of the act were scheduled to be temporary.  The large majority of the tax 
reductions took the form of rebates, tax credits, and increases in the standard deduction (1976 Economic Report, pp. 
50-51).  Thus, the changes lowered taxes for most taxpayers by similar amounts, with little impact on marginal tax 
rates.  The act also included a temporary increase in the investment tax credit. 
                                                     
a The table shows total net revenue effects from tax changes of ￿$20.9 billion.  Subtracting off the ￿$8.1 billion due 
to the rebate yields ￿$12.8 billion. 
  
Exhibit 2 
Narrative Analysis of a Spending-Driven Tax Change 
 
 
Revenue Act of 1951 
 
 Signed  10/20/51 
  1951Q4   +$10.0 billion  (Endogenous; Spending) 
  1952Q1   ￿$4.6 billion  (Endogenous; Spending) 
 
  The motivation for the Revenue Act of 1951 was again the increase in spending related to the Korean War.  
The 1951 Economic Report stated:  ￿These new taxes are required to finance the defense effort; and to help keep 
total spending within the capacity of current production, so that inflation does not reduce the purchasing power￿ (p. 
17).  This same sentiment was echoed in a number of presidential speeches.  On February 2, 1951, Truman said, ￿If 
we do not tax ourselves enough to pay for defense expenditures, the Government will ￿ add to total purchasing 
power and inflationary pressures￿ (Special Message to the Congress Recommending a ￿Pay as We Go￿ Tax 
Program, p. 2).  These quotations make it clear that the tax increase was designed to keep growth normal.   
The House report on the bill emphasized that the tax increase was explicitly to pay for the Korean War.  It 
stated:  ￿The military action in Korea, coupled with the general threat to world peace, has made it necessary to 
provide extraordinary increases in revenues to meet essential national defense expenditures￿ (82
d Congress, 1
st 
Session, House of Representatives Report No. 586, 6/18/51, p. 1).  It also stressed the temporary nature of the tax, 
saying:  ￿The 12‰-percent flat across-the-board increase [in individual income tax rates] was selected as the form of 
increase, since it is not intended that this increase will be permanent, and therefore, it was desired to provide an 
increase which would not become an integral part of the rate structure￿ (p. 8). 
Because the tax increase was designed to counteract the effects of higher military spending and thereby 
keep growth normal, we classify it as an endogenous, spending-driven action. 
  Truman￿s speech upon signing the bill stated that it would raise about $5.5 billion of additional revenues at 
an annual rate (Statement by the President Upon Signing the Revenue Act of 1951, 10/20/51, p. 1).  Both the 1952 
Economic Report (p. 135) and the 1951 Treasury Annual Report (p. 44) gave the figure as $5.4 billion.  We follow 
our usual practice and use the number from the Economic Report. 
The increase in corporate taxes was retroactive to April 1, 1951, while the remainder took effect on 
November 1, 1951 (1951 Treasury Annual Report, p. 51).  Because the action took place before the middle of the 
quarter, we date the tax increase in 1951Q4.  Approximately $2.3 billion of the tax increase was from corporate 
taxes (p. 501).  Therefore, the retroactive portion of the bill increased taxes at an annual rate of $2.3 billion • 2 extra 
quarters, or $4.6 billion.  Adding this to the steady-state effect of $5.4 billion yields a tax increase of $10 billion in 
1951Q4.  The return to the steady-state level of tax increase implies a tax cut of $4.6 billion in 1952Q1.  If one 
ignored the retroactive part of the legislation, there would be just a tax increase of $5.4 billion in 1951Q4. 
  The tax increase largely took the form of an increase in marginal rates.  The act also raised the capital gains 
tax, the tax on corporate profits, and some excise taxes (1951 Treasury Annual Report, pp. 50-52).  Most of the 
changes were explicitly temporary.  The individual income tax increases were legislated to expire on January 1, 
1954; the corporate and excise tax increases were to continue until March 31, 1954 (1951 Treasury Annual Report, 
pp. 51-52).  




Narrative Analysis of a Deficit-Driven Tax Change 
 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 
 
 Signed  8/10/93 
  1993Q3   +$68.4 billion  (Exogenous; Deficit) 
  1993Q4   ￿$40.3 billion  (Exogenous; Deficit) 
  1994Q1   +$13.4 billion  (Exogenous; Deficit) 
 
  The motivation for this tax change was deficit reduction.  In a speech to Congress describing his economic 
proposals, President Clinton called for ￿a deficit reduction program that will increase the savings available for the 
private sector to invest, will lower interest rates, will decrease the percentage of the Federal budget claimed by 
interest payments, and decrease the risk of financial market disruptions that could adversely affect our economy￿ 
(Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on Administration Goals, 2/17/93, p. 2).  He went on to say, ￿Over the 
long run, all this will bring us a higher rate of economic growth, improved productivity, more high-quality jobs, and 
an improved economic competitive position in the world￿ (p. 2).  In a radio address, he said his plan called for ￿a 
little more in deficit reduction today, so that we can all enjoy better jobs and higher incomes tomorrow￿ (The 
President￿s Radio Address, 5/15/93, p. 1).  Similarly, the 1994 Economic Report stated, ￿Reducing the budget 
deficit was a necessary part of clearing away the financial underbrush ￿ so that economic growth could be put on a 
sounder and more sustained footing￿ (p. 31). 
  Congress also viewed the central purpose of the tax change as deficit reduction.  The House report on the 
bill stated, ￿This bill embodies all the basic elements of President Clinton￿s program to turn our country away from 
being an excess-consumption economy and toward investment in the future productivity of our people￿ (103
rd 
Congress, 1
st session, House of Representatives Report No. 103-111, 5/25/93, pp. 1-2).  The report went on to 
describe the bill as ￿the necessary first step in long-run deficit control￿ (p. 2), and to say that ￿[i]t reduces the huge 
drain on the nation￿s savings pool that the deficit represents￿ (p. 3).  A secondary motive in Congress was increased 
progressivity.  For example, the House report stated, ￿The tax package restores tax code progressivity lost in recent 
years￿ (p. 4).  The justifications for the major specific revenue-increasing features of the package focused almost 
entirely on deficit reduction and progressivity (see, for example, pp. 635, 643, and 655).  A desire to offset short-
term cyclical factors was never mentioned as a reason for the changes.  Thus, this tax change is clearly an 
exogenous, deficit-driven action. 
  The timing of the tax changes called for in the legislation was somewhat complicated.  Large parts of the 
changes were retroactive to January 1, 1993, and some smaller changes were retroactive as well.  Other major parts 
went into effect on January 1, 1994.  Finally, some features went into effect between these two dates, notably an 
increase in the gasoline tax on October 1, 1993 (1995 Budget, Analytical Perspectives, pp. 36-39). 
  The effects of the bill on fiscal 1994 revenues were complicated by the retroactive features and by the fact 
that not all of the changes were in effect for the full fiscal year.  We therefore use the estimated revenue effects for 
fiscal 1995 (the first full fiscal year the changes were in effect) as the starting point for our estimates.  CBO reported 
that the bill was expected to increase revenues in fiscal 1995 by $41.5 billion (An Economic Analysis of the 
Revenue Provisions of OBRA-93, January 1994, pp. 2-3).  A Joint Committee on Taxation document (Estimated 
Budget Effects of the Revenue Provisions of H.R. 2264 (the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993) as Agreed 
to by the Conferees, JCX-11-93, 8/4/93) provided a detailed breakdown of this figure by provision, together with 
their effective dates.  $22.8 billion was retroactive, almost entirely to the beginning of 1993; $5.3 billion went into 
effect during 1993, almost entirely on October 1; and $13.4 billion went into effect at the beginning of 1994. 
  Combining these estimates and using our usual procedure for dealing with retroactive changes yields a tax 
increase of $68.4 billion in 1993Q3, a cut of $40.3 billion in 1993Q4, and an increase of $13.4 billion in 1994Q1.  If 
one did not account for the retroactive features, the estimates would be an increase of $22.8 billion in 1993Q3, an 
increase of $5.3 billion in 1993Q4, and an increase of $13.4 billion in 1994Q1. 
  The bill also included provisions calling for substantial spending cuts.  The administration estimated the 
reductions, including lower interest payments because of lower deficits, at $255 billion over five years (Remarks on 
Signing the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, 8/10/93, p. 1).  CBO estimated the reductions, excluding 
reduced interest payments, as $146 billion over the same period (An Economic Analysis of the Revenue Provisions 
of OBRA-93, January 1994, p. 1). 
  Roughly two-thirds of the additional revenues came from higher marginal rates on high-income individuals 
(from both the regular income tax and the repeal of the cap on income subject to the Medicare tax).  The remaining 
third came from a wide array of sources.  The changes were almost all intended to be permanent.  
Exhibit 4 
Narrative Analysis of a Long-Run Tax Change 
 
 
Revenue Act of 1964 
 
 Signed  2/26/64 
  1964Q2   ￿$16.8 billion  (Exogenous; Long-run) 
  1964Q3   +$8.4 billion  (Exogenous; Long-run) 
  1965Q1   ￿$4.5 billion  (Exogenous; Long-run) 
 
  The motivation for the 1964 tax cut was the same as for the 1962 investment tax credit:  faster long-run 
growth.  Once again, there was no fear of a recession at the time the act was proposed or passed.  The Revenue Act 
of 1964 was first proposed in the summer of 1962.  President Kennedy, in his Radio and Television Report to the 
American People on the State of the National Economy, stated explicitly that the tax cut was not for countercyclical 
reasons:  ￿Let me emphasize, however, that I have not been talking about a different kind of tax cut, a quick, 
temporary tax cut, to prevent a new recession￿ (8/13/62, p. 5).  This view was repeated in two speeches in January 
1963 (Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, 1/14/63, pp. 1-2; Special Message to the Congress 
on Tax Reduction and Reform, 1/24/63, p. 1).  Likewise, the 1963 Economic Report stated:  ￿We approach the issue 
of tax revision, not in an atmosphere of haste and panic brought on by recession or depression, but in a period of 
comparative calm￿ (p. xiii).  The Economic Report mentioned the possible countercyclical benefits of the tax cut, 
but made it clear that they were a sidelight.  It stated:  ￿While the basic purpose of my tax program is to meet our 
longer run economic challenges, we should not forget its role in strengthening our defenses against recession￿ (p. 
xxi).  A similar statement was made in the 1965 Economic Report (p. 8).  If anything, the economy was even 
stronger by the time the act was passed.   President Johnson, in his Annual Budget Message to the Congress, Fiscal 
Year 1965, cited statistics showing solid economic growth and emphasized:  ￿This is a record of strong expansion￿ 
(1/21/64, p. 3). 
  Kennedy and Johnson both gave as the rationale for the tax cut the need to eliminate fiscal drag so the 
economy could grow faster.  In his August 1962 address, President Kennedy said:  ￿our present tax system is a drag 
on economic recovery and economic growth,￿ and ￿this administration intends to cut taxes in order to build the 
fundamental strength of our economy, to remove a serious barrier to long-term growth￿ (Radio and Television 
Report to the American People on the State of the National Economy, 8/13/62, p. 4).  In his Special Message to the 
Congress on Tax Reduction and Reform, Kennedy stated:  ￿the largest single barrier to full employment of our 
manpower and resources and to a higher rate of economic growth is the unrealistically heavy drag of Federal income 
taxes on private purchasing power, initiative, and incentive￿ (1/24/63, p. 1).  Johnson reiterated this view (Annual 
Budget Message to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1965, 1/21/64, p. 1).  Both administrations argued that the tax cut 
would stimulate economic growth.  For example, the 1964 Economic Report stated:  ￿The tax cut will give a 
sustained lift, year-in and year-out, to the American economy￿ (p. 8). 
  As with the 1962 tax cut, there was much discussion of an output gap and less-than-full employment.  But, 
it is clear that performance was not perceived as low relative to normal, only low relative to ideal.  For example, 
Kennedy stated in his Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union:  ￿America has enjoyed 22 months 
of uninterrupted economic recovery.  But recovery is not enough.  If we are to prevail in the long run, we must 
expand the long-run strength of our economy.  We must move along the path to a higher rate of growth and full 
employment￿ (1/14/63, pp. 1-2).  Johnson sounded a similar theme in January 1964.  He stated:  ￿despite the 
creation of 2 1/2 million new jobs in our economy, the unemployment rate now stands at 5 1/2 %.  Our factories 
continue to produce below their optimum rate.  As a nation we are producing at a rate at least $30 billion below our 
comfortable capacity￿ (Annual Budget Message to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1965, 1/21/64, p. 3). 
  The discussion of the reason for the tax cut given in Congressional documents parallels those in 
administration sources.  The House report on the 1963 version of the bill stated:  ￿The principal purpose of the 
revenue bill of 1963 is to remove from the private sector of the American economy its present high-tax straitjacket; 
that is, to lessen restraints which prevent the American free-enterprise system from itself generating necessary 
growth.  A purpose of this bill also is to improve the equity of the tax laws￿ (88
th Congress, 1
st Session, House of 
Representatives Report No. 749, 9/13/63, p. 6).  The Senate report also stressed the motivation of improving 
incentives and equity:  ￿The bill will cut back on excessive tax rates which unnecessarily restrain individual and 
business incentives, it will provide the increased consumer and business purchasing power to assure continued 
expansion, and it will improve the equity of the tax system￿ (88
th Congress, 2
d Session, Senate Report No. 830,  
 
 
1/28/64, p. 1). 
  Like the administration sources, both Congressional reports mention the need to reduce unemployment as 
an important motivation.  However, it is clear that the desire was to reduce unemployment below its historical norm.  
The Senate report stated:  ￿Despite the fact that business conditions have been improving over the past 33 months, 
unemployment still is at the high rate of 5.5 percent￿ (Senate Report No. 830, p. 6).  It also noted:  ￿we have 
experienced a succession of disappointing recoveries in which the unemployment rate has remained disturbingly 
high; this rate, in fact, has not been below 5 percent since 1957￿ (p. 6).  It concluded that ￿the growth rate of our 
economy must be increased if the requisite jobs are to be found for this expanding labor force￿ (p. 6).  The House 
report was even more explicit that the motivation of the bill was to provide supranormal growth.  It stated:   
￿Maintaining the 3-percent rate of growth as the United States has done since 1956, not only will fail to eliminate 
the present excessive unemployment, but unemployment will continue to rise as the increasing numbers of children 
born during the war and early postwar years reach employment age￿ (House Report No. 749, p. 10). 
  Because the Revenue Act of 1964 was motivated by a desire for faster-than-normal growth, and not by 
concern about current cyclical conditions, we classify it as an exogenous, long-run change. 
  The legislation cut taxes in two stages.  The cut in 1964, which was passed in late February, was made 
retroactive to January 1, 1964.  There was an additional cut in January 1965.  Around the time the bill was passed, 
the revenue effects were generally reported as a decline of $7.7 billion in 1964 and $11.5 billion in 1965 (for 
example, 1963 Treasury Annual Report, pp. XVII, XXIII; Radio and Television Remarks Upon Signing the Tax 
Bill, 2/26/64, p. 1; and 1964 Economic Report, p. 8).  However, these calculations were performed at 1963 income 
levels (1963 Treasury Annual Report, p. XXIII).  The 1965 Economic Report reported the effects in 1964 at 
expected 1964 income levels as $8.4 billion (p. 65).  We use this figure as our estimate of the tax cut in 1964. 
  Both the 1965 Economic Report (p. 65) and the President￿s 1966 Budget Message (Annual Budget 
Message to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1966, 1/25/65, p. 4) reported that the full cut would reduce revenues in 1965 
by $14 billion.  The 1965 Treasury Annual Report gave the figure of $13.7 billion, and made it clear that this was at 
expected 1965 income levels (pp. 275, 294).  Some of the additional revenue loss in 1965 compared with 1964, 
however, reflected not the additional cuts in 1965, but a greater effect of the initial cuts because of rising incomes.  
It appears that the effect of a given set of tax cuts was expected to increase by about 9 percent per year.  For 
example, the estimated effect of the 1964 cuts was 8.7 percent greater at 1964 incomes than at 1963 incomes, and 
the estimated effect of the overall cut was 17.5 percent higher at 1965 incomes than at 1963 incomes (percentage 
changes are computed as changes in logs, and $13.7 billion is used for the effect of the overall cut at 1965 incomes).  
This is consistent with 6 percent annual nominal GNP growth (1966 Budget, p. 50) and an elasticity of the revenue 
loss with respect to nominal GNP of about 1.5.  We therefore estimate that in the absence of the second round of tax 
cuts, the 1964 reductions would have lowered revenue in 1965 by 9 percent more than $8.4 billion, or $9.2 billion.  
Thus our estimate of the effect of the additional cuts at the beginning of 1965 is a revenue reduction of $13.7 billion 
minus $9.2 billion, or $4.5 billion. 
  This estimate is broadly consistent with the statement in the 1965 Economic Report that the 1965 cuts 
would lower individual income taxes by $3 billion and corporate income taxes by $1 billion (p. 10).  It is also 
consistent with the fact that two-thirds of the reduction in individual income tax rates ￿ which were by far the largest 
part of the tax cut ￿ occurred in 1964 and one-third in 1965 (1964 Treasury Annual Report, p. 243). 
  The tax cut was signed more than halfway through the first quarter of 1964.  Therefore, following our usual 
procedure, we assign the first stage of the cut to 1964Q2.  Because the tax cut was retroactive to January 1, 1964, 
our usual procedures identify a tax cut (at an annual rate) of $8.4 billion plus … ($8.4 billion) • 4, or $16.8 billion, in 
1964Q2.  The retroactive part then disappeared in 1964Q3.  Thus, there was an exogenous tax increase of $8.4 
billion in that quarter.  We then identify a second exogenous tax cut of $4.4 billion in 1965Q1.  Note, if one chose to 
ignore the retroactive nature of the tax cut, the revenue estimates would be:  ￿$8.4 billion in 1964Q2 and ￿$4.5 
billion in 1965Q1. 
  The Revenue Act of 1964 lowered marginal tax rates from the previous range of 20-91% to 14-70%.  It 
also lowered corporate tax rates, with the largest reduction being for small businesses (Annual Budget Message to 








                                                                 Using New Measure          Using Change in        
                                                                       of Exogenous            Cyclically Adjusted 
  Variable                   Tax Changes                     Revenues 
 
  Constant    0.79   1.03 
     (0.07)  (0.12) 
 Tax  Change: 
       Lag 0   ￿0.16   0.03 
     (0.18)    (0.14) 
       Lag 1   ￿0.16  0.19 
     (0.20)    (0.14) 
       Lag 2   ￿0.04  0.12 
     (0.20)    (0.14) 
       Lag 3   ￿0.33  ￿0.23 
     (0.20)    (0.14) 
       Lag 4   ￿0.33  ￿0.14 
     (0.20)    (0.14) 
       Lag 5   ￿0.27  ￿0.20 
     (0.20)    (0.14) 
       Lag 6   ￿0.26  ￿0.33 
     (0.20)    (0.14) 
       Lag 7   ￿0.57  ￿0.16 
     (0.17)    (0.14) 
       Lag 8   ￿0.36  ￿0.21 
     (0.17)  (0.14) 
       Lag 9   ￿0.35  ￿0.17 
     (0.17)    (0.14) 
       Lag 10  ￿0.20  0.01 
     (0.17)    (0.14) 
       Lag 11   0.05  0.11 
     (0.17)    (0.14) 
       Lag 12   0.05  ￿0.15 
     (0.16)  (0.14) 
  
 R
2   0.09    0.09 
 D.W.    1.29  1.33 
 s.e.e.    0.96  0.94 
 
Note:  Estimates of equation (1) in the text.  The sample period 
is 1950Q1￿2006Q2 (1950Q2￿2006Q2 for cyclically adjusted 
revenues).  The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
  
Figure 1 
New Measure of Exogenous Tax Changes















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Deficit-Driven Tax Changes 
Figure 2
New Measure of Endogenous Tax Changes






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4  


















Estimated Impact of a Tax Increase of 1% of GDP on GDP
 


















Change in Cyclically Adjusted Revenues
















t All Legislated Tax Changes
Endogenous Tax Changes 
Figure 6
Estimated Impact of a Tax Increase of 1% of GDP on GDP
 











































Deficit-Driven Tax Changes 
Figure 7 
Estimated Impact of a Tax Increase of 1% of GDP on GDP Excluding Korea


















Change in Cyclically Adjusted Revenues 
Figure 8 
Estimated Impact of an Exogenous Tax Increase of 1% of GDP on GDP 




















Estimated Impact of an Exogenous Tax Increase of 1% of GDP on GDP 
Controlling for Monetary Policy 







































Estimated Impact of a Tax Increase of 1% of GDP on GDP 
Controlling for Government Spending 










































Without Control With Control 
Figure 11 
Estimated Impact of a Tax Increase of 1% of GDP on GDP
Including Tax Changes Dated Both at Time of Change and at Time of Passage
 





















Tax Changes Dated in Quarter of Change
Present Value of Tax Changes Dated in Quarter of Passage





















Tax Changes Dated in Quarter of Change
Present Value of Tax Changes Dated in Quarter of Passage 
Figure 12
Estimated Impact of an Exogenous Tax Increase of 1% of GDP on GDP 






















Estimated Impact of an Exogenous Tax Increase of 1% of GDP 
on Inflation and Unemployment 






















































Estimated Impact of an Exogenous Tax Increase of 1% of GDP on the Components of GDP 
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Estimated Impact of a Deficit-Driven Tax Increase of 1% of GDP on the Components of GDP 
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